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This thesis examined how the Navy’s Program Executive Office Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I) has performed 
enterprise risk management (ERM). Based on ERM literature, the study developed an 
analytical framework to assess PEO C4I’s ERM practices against documented ERM best 
practices, including evaluating a new risk in terms of its impact on existing risks and 
ensuring risks are managed at the most detailed level possible. The thesis also utilized 
organizational alignment literature to include organizational alignment principles in the 
evaluation. Key principles include 1) every employee has the responsibility to manage 
risk and 2) multiple teams are able to manage a single risk. The resultant analytical 
framework was applied to PEO C4I and documented for application to other 
organizations. PEO C4I performed well in the areas of 1) evaluating risks in areas other 
than the originating program office and 2) providing the framework to elevate risks to 
leadership. PEO C4I could use improvement in cross-team risk coordination and 
development of enterprise models to provide context for enterprise risks. Recommended 
interventions focus on having more functional areas involved in risk mitigation and 
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Risk management is a critical aspect of managing any program. This is especially 
true in the Department of Defense (DOD); there is an official DOD publication 
specifically aimed at providing guidance for managing risks within acquisition programs. 
As defense systems become less stove-piped and require greater system-of-systems 
interoperability, risk management must also expand to consider potential risks beyond 
any single system boundary. These risks could be technical, schedule, or cost driven, but 
any cross-system dependency requires cross-system risk management. 
To this end, DOD, as well as businesses in many other industries, are turning 
toward enterprise risk management. Enterprise risk management includes a broader and 
more strategic set of specific risk management principles and best practices; also it is 
dependent on a foundational shift in organizational alignment to ensure that best practices 
may be implemented to their fullest. This is true regardless of whether the organization is 
functionally or product-aligned, or a hybrid of both. 
In order to implement an enterprise risk management strategy, an organization 
must first understand its current strengths and weaknesses. Viewed strictly from the 
perspective of more fully managing risk, both functional- and product-aligned 
organizations have strengths and weaknesses. There is much historical and current 
research on what organizational structures best support meeting specific performance 
goals, and some of the aspects that are focused on maximizing a risk management 
strategy may not directly align with maximizing other organizational functions.  
For this study, the focus was on how to set up an evaluation framework to 
determine how well aligned an organization was to implement enterprise risk 
management best practices. The Navy’s program executive office (PEO) for command, 
control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) was chosen as a case study 
for utilizing the proposed criteria. The PEO has a decidedly hybrid organizational 
structure, which includes several product-aligned program offices as well as a set of 
functionally aligned specialty organizations both at the PEO level as well as embedded in 
xviii 
the program offices. The enterprise risk management effort is strongly aligned to the PEO 
engineering functional organization, an alignment that provides many benefits for 
analyzing technical risks but also many limitations for non-technical risk identification 
and mitigation efforts. 
Managing risks at an enterprise level also requires alignment across the enterprise, 
or all portions of an organization, with regard to how risks are defined, assigned, 
managed, tracked and mitigated. If there are multiple definitions of what constitutes a 
risk across different parts of the organization, then risks will not be defined in like terms 
or evaluated with equivalent criticality. The PEO C4I Enterprise Technical Risk Board 
(ETRB) does an effective job of having technical staff from all aspects of the 
organization nominate and review risks; however, the ability to identify or manage risks 
beyond the technical domain is severely limited by the lack of non-engineering staff 
involved in the ETRB. Also, there is not a clear set of standard operating procedures or 
common risk definitions that could be used to normalize risks originating from different 
parts of the PEO. This leads to risks being assessed as more or less critical than they 
really are as the criticality assessment is made by whoever initially nominates the risk. 
Utilizing evaluation criteria from authoritative research in both organizational 
alignment and enterprise risk management best practices, the study of PEO C4I’s ETRB 
results in several recommendations. In terms of organizational alignment, it is 
recommended that every employee or functional area within the PEO should be directly 
assigned risk management responsibilities. This increases the likelihood of risks being 
discovered and nominated to the ETRB. It also expands the membership of the ETRB 
beyond the current engineering staff. It is recommended that there be regular guidance 
from PEO leadership on their core areas of focus and potential risks at a strategic level to 
ensure the ETRB is focusing risk management efforts in areas viewed as strategically 
critical to the PEO. Finally, it would be beneficial for the ETRB to have a documented 
regular and recurring path to notify PEO leadership of enterprise level risks that are in 
need of leadership engagement to help mitigate. This ensures risks shared by multiple 
portions of the PEO can be better mitigated across program lines. 
xix 
There are also several recommendations to improve the PEO’s implementation of 
enterprise risk management best practices. The first is defining an enterprise risk template 
to ensure all risks nominated for enterprise management are defined in common terms 
and with consistent criticality metrics. This avoids unintentional bias of under or over 
assessing criticality, or describing the risk in insufficient detail for an effective mitigation 
strategy to be developed. Also, to aid in commonly defining enterprise risks, it is 
necessary for there to be an over-arching enterprise architecture for the entire system-of-
systems within the control of the PEO. A common enterprise architecture will aid in 
defining enterprise risks as all ETRB participants would then have a shared 
understanding of the end state technical, and associated programmatic, goals of the 
various programs within PEO C4I. Having this common understanding gives a consistent 
reference point for risk definition, whether a function that is missing from the enterprise 
architecture, a poorly-defined interface, or some other gap or inconsistency requiring 
action. 
Implementing these recommendations will provide an improved foundation both 
in regards to organizational alignment and adherence to enterprise risk management best 
practices. The result is a PEO organization more adept at identifying and managing risks 
beyond the scope of any single portfolio or functional area. The key evaluation criteria 
identified in this review also provide a framework that could be re-used to identify 
organizational and enterprise risk management strengths and weaknesses in any 
organization, whether within DOD or otherwise. Future expansion of the criteria as more 
research is done and more case studies executed would be an excellent topic for future 
research. 
xx 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. IMPORTANCE OF ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—PROBLEM 
STATEMENT 
Risk management is one of the central tenets of program management, both in 
industry and in the Department of Defense (DOD). Risk management receives such 
emphasis that there is an entire DOD publication dedicated to defining how acquisition 
programs should handle risk, the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, most 
recently released in 2015. This guide describes the steps of risk management: Risk 
Identification, Risk Analysis, Risk Mitigation Planning, and Risk Tracking. It also 
addresses risk management roles at different levels of the organization. What it does not 
do, however, is discuss how to handle risks beyond the boundaries of a single program. It 
does not address enterprise risk management. 
Enterprise risk management is not a new concept, originating in the mid-1990s in 
private industry (Dickinson 2001). The principles of risk management do not necessarily 
change when implemented at the enterprise level, but the involved participants and scope 
of risks being considered both broaden, potentially quite substantially. This indicates that 
to implement fully the principles of enterprise risk management, an organization must 
have both an implementable risk management strategy, as well as orient their 
organization and key participants’ duties to focus on risk management as a priority across 
all areas. Therefore, risk management best practices and key concepts of organizational 
alignment are proposed to be equally critical to successful enterprise risk management. 
The concept of enterprise risk management is taking on such emphasis that there 
are even graduate programs offering master’s degrees in enterprise risk management 
showing up at American universities such as St. John’s University and Columbia 
University in New York and Johns Hopkins University in Maryland.  
While each of these programs is part of its respective university’s business school, 
the concept of managing risk at an enterprise, or system-of-systems level is also taking 
hold in the DOD. To this end, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
2 
(SPAWAR) Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I) has established at the PEO front office level, an 
Enterprise Technical Risk Board (ETRB) run by the PEO’s engineering functional area 
lead.  
The ETRB Charter states that the scope of the board is to assess and manage, 
“Any risk that affects system dependencies which requires coordination/cooperation and 
technical performance between two or more programs or projects from different [offices] 
or other external systems” (PEO C4I 2015, 3). Given this goal, this thesis reviewed both 
the implementation of risk management best practices employed by the ETRB as well as 
the alignment of PEO C4I’s organization to enable risk management, while addressing 
the question as to whether that organizational alignment could be improved to better 
provide for enterprise risk management. Later in this chapter is a description of an 
analysis method that could be applied to any organization to evaluate alignment to 
organizational optimization and employment of risk management principles for effective 
enterprise risk management. Later in this thesis, that evaluation method is applied to 
assess the PEO C4I ETRB in particular. 
B. ALIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES IN DOD 
Chapter II will briefly discuss general principles of common organizational 
structures, but the emphasis is in relation to those structures commonly employed by the 
Department of Defense and the goals of each organization with regard to risk 
management. It should be noted that the top-level organizational chart of the DOD, 




Figure 1.  DOD Organizational Structure. Source: DCMO (2015). 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the acquisition organizations under the individual 
military services are essentially project-aligned organizations. They have specific mission 
sets they are assigned to carry out and have functional experts in various fields aligned to 
support them. On the same organizational chart, however, the 20 Defense Agencies in the 
lower left are more functionally organized. They have specific and well-defined areas of 
expertise, and while there may be some personnel with other functional expertise in their 
organizations, they are nonetheless focused on one specific function, whether that be in 
the area of intelligence, security, or information systems, among others.  
This review is focused on the management of enterprise risks at the level of a 
program executive office, which is specifically charged with the development, 
integration, fielding, sustainment, and overall acquisition of Navy systems in the domain 
of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence. A specific, but still 
4 
very far-reaching set of capabilities. This context of a collection of product-aligned 
organizations will serve as the framework for defining the boundaries of the “enterprise” 
for the PEO C4I ETRB, but will also provide a basis for comparing how enterprise risk 
management would operate in other variations of DOD organizational structures.  
It should also be noted that DOD organizations are continuously evolving; in fact, 
a Defense Acquisition University (DAU) study in 2007 of overall defense acquisition 
structures found that change was one of the few constants in regards to DOD 
organizational structures. Despite the finding of continuous changes within DOD 
organizational structures, that same study surprisingly concluded that many of the 
organizational adjustments within acquisition organizations were not to help maximize 
their acquisition efforts. In fact, the study concluded that these reorganizations were often 
intended to improve office productivity, but were also “based on overly optimistic 
budget, schedule and technology readiness forecasts” (DAU 2007, viii), perhaps an 
indictment of their use, or lack of use, of enterprise risk management principles in 
framing the respective reorganizations. This underscores a key tenet of this thesis’ 
research effort: ensuring that organizational alignment is being maximized for the 
purposes of enterprise risk management, specifically with regards to the PEO C4I ETRB. 
C. OVERVIEW OF PEO C4I ETRB 
Each of the subsequent chapters in this thesis will examine the degree to which 
the PEO C4I ETRB aligns with core principles of organizational alignment and risk 
management for the purposes of enterprise risk management. To provide context to that 
analysis, this section will provide a brief overview of PEO C4I and its Enterprise 
Technical Risk Board. 
Figure 2 provides a high-level view of the PEO C4I organizational structure. Note 
that the PEO contains both product and functionally aligned organizations. The product-
aligned organizations are the program offices, or Program Manager Warfare offices 
(PMWs) in PEO C4I terms. Each program office is run by a program manager and is 
charged with a specific grouping of products, such as Command and Control. The 
functionally aligned organizations are run by the individuals noted in the box to the left 
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of the PEO in Figure 2. These include functional organizations for installations, logistics, 
engineering, and science and technology. It is the PEO functional lead for engineering, 
the Assistant Program Executive Officer for Engineering (APEO-E) who chairs the PEO 
C4I ETRB. The benefits and drawbacks of having the functionally aligned engineering 
organization manage enterprise risks on behalf of both the functional and product-
centered portions of the PEO are examined in Chapter II. 
 
Figure 2.  PEO C4I Organizational Structure. Source: PEO C4I (2014). 
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The ETRB was charted in March 2015 and was tasked with the following 
objectives: 
• Determine whether a submitted risk/issue should be designated as an 
Enterprise Technical Risk (ETR). 
• Identify a lead (ETR owner) responsible for ensuring that the ETR is kept 
up to date, with mature language describing the ETR and associated 
mitigation plans. 
• Evaluate the adequacy of mitigation plans developed for ETRs. 
• Provide a disposition on whether an ETR has been successfully mitigated 
(PEO C4I 2015, 3). 
As with many other organizational risk management plans, the charter also 
stipulates that risks can be raised by any member or from other parallel organizational 
boards. The charter also lists the required membership which consists of the chair and 
required membership. The Assistant Program Executive Officer for Engineering, the 
engineering functional lead for the PEO as shown in Figure 2, is established as the chair 
of the board. The other required members are the engineering supervisors and 
engineering staff embedded in each program office. All other members are listed purely 
in an advisory capacity and attend only as necessary or desired on their part. 
The core responsibility for the chair and required members is to “Provide 
technical feedback, analysis and recommendations on submitted ETRs” (PEO C4I 2015, 
5; emphasis added). The board is scheduled to meet at least monthly, with sessions more 
frequently if events dictate. The key facets of this board are further discussed in Chapters 
II, III and IV, but this section shall be referenced throughout that analysis. 
D. ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
With the assertion that successful enterprise risk management is dependent on 
both an organization’s ability to adopt and follow risk management best practices as well 
as align the organizational roles to achieve a holistic focus on risk in each position, the 
analysis of the PEO C4I ETRB will need to be evaluated in both contexts. This will 
involve identifying enterprise risk management best practices and organizational 
alignment key tenets as evaluation criteria to be utilized in the analysis.  
7 
Chapter II will review organizational constructs and strategies to ensure 
organizational focus on risk management. Chapter III will discuss enterprise risk 
management best practices. Within each of those chapters, evaluation criteria are 
discussed and used to determine to what extent the PEO C4I ETRB adopts those tenets. 
These criteria were gathered from authoritative, published research in both the 
organizational alignment and enterprise risk management fields. 
To perform the analysis, each evaluation criterion will have an ideal case as 
derived from the source research. It is not expected that any enterprise risk management 
strategy would meet the ideal case in each organizational alignment or risk best practices 
area, but rather the criteria are established to provide context to evaluate the enterprise 
risk management strategy in both domains. If an enterprise risk management strategy is 
designed to focus only on risks in a certain functional area, or only in a certain part of the 
product life-cycle, then some aspects of the organizational alignment may be 
intentionally ignored and some features of enterprise risk management given minimal 
attention so as to make best use of resources and energy on the organizational priorities. 
Since the goal is to provide a framework for an objective analysis in both the 
organizational alignment and risk management best practices domains, a repeatable 
analysis framework should be established. As mentioned previously, a conclusion that an 
enterprise risk management effort is weak in a certain area does not mean that the 
strategy is ill-formed if the lack of focus in that area is intentional. The results would 
provide feedback on strengths and weaknesses of a risk management approach with 
regard to organizational and risk management best practices. Any conclusions or changes 
driven by the evaluation would be at the discretion of the organization. To capture the 
summary of each evaluation, a comparison matrix is utilized; a blank version of this 
matrix for use in the analysis of the any organization is included in the Appendix. The 
analysis includes a description of core principles, both in regards to organizational 
alignment and risk management. This set of core principles is paired with a definition of 
what an ideal implementation entails, and then a description of how the PEO C4I ETRB 
aligns to that ideal case. The final column of the matrix is a top-level analysis of the 
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quality of alignment between the PEO C4I ETRB and the core principle in question. The 
core principles to be used as evaluation criteria are: 
Organizational Alignment 
• Employee’s Responsibility / Accountability for Managing Risk (Liu 2011) 
• Cross-Team Coordination for Purpose of Managing Risk (Hardy 2015) 
• Allowance for Multiple Teams to Co-Own Risk Mitigation (Liu 2011) 
• Enterprise-Level Definition of Risk Management Practices (Galliano 
2011) and Risk Areas for Each Organizational Component (Roberts 1991) 
• Evaluating Risk in Terms of Impact to Efforts Other Than Your Own 
(Tonello 2007) 
 
Risk Management Best Practices 
• Ability to Consider Short-Term and Long-Term Impacts to Risk (Tonello 
2007) 
• Evaluating a New Risk with Regard to its Impact on Existing Risks (Liu 
2011) 
• Risks Managed at the Most Detailed Level Possible (Liu 2011) 
• Presence of Enterprise Engineering Models or Architectures to Provide 
Objective Context for Technical Risks (Brunson et al. 2009) 
• Risks Evaluated with Context of System Position in Acquisition Life-
Cycle (Stevens et al. 2009) 
• Assessment of Ability to Mitigate Risk in Current Enterprise Architecture 
(Langford et al. 2008) 
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Authoritative research was utilized to determine which evaluation criteria were 
most relevant in assessing organizational efforts to enable enterprise risk management. 
These criteria fell into the broad categories of organizational alignment and risk 
management best principles, and the research approach included review of publications 
emphasizing those areas in general but also within the context of DOD in particular. 
1. Organizational Alignment 
Organizational focus on enterprise risk management in particular has significantly 
increased in recent years. The concept that risk is not something to be managed only at 
the level of individual business units or functional areas is discussed in depth by Matteo 
Tonello (2007) in Emerging Governance Practices in Enterprise Risk Management. This 
includes a discussion of the benefits, as well as drawbacks of elevating risk management 
to an executive board level. This is so risks can be managed by senior executives with a 
vision that includes not just resolving risks impacting a particular unit in their 
organization, but also take into account the potential strategic impacts of various 
approaches to mitigating those risks. Also among the benefits is the ability of senior 
leaders to take something seen as a risk through the eyes of a functional manager and 
potentially to turn it into a future opportunity when viewed at a strategic level. 
 A view of enterprise risk management as it is being organizationally adopted in 
the federal government is presented by Karen Hardy in Enterprise Risk Management: A 
Guide for Government Professionals, published in 2015. This examines not only the risk 
management techniques that are key to enterprise risk management, but it examines the 
concept of enterprise risk management in a federal government as potentially being 
nearly on a world-altering scale. Methods for coordinating across federal agencies to try 
to mitigate the risks that result from the occurrence of a natural disaster is one such 
example. Similar to Tonello’s (2007) assertions, Hardy (2015) emphasizes the need for 
agency executive-level involvement. This higher-level engagement helps ensure that 
organizational perspectives beyond the individual department, or even individual agency, 
are considered when it comes to risk management. Having services unavailable in one 
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agency, while not only a risk to it, could also become a much broader risk in the event of 
a natural emergency when other agencies are counting on that same service. 
 A common definition of where the organization considers its risks to be, and what 
it defines as the minimum threshold for a potential problem to be considered a risk are 
reviewed at a high-level by Carlos Galliano (2011) in his presentation entitled 
Implementation of an Enterprise Level Risk Management Process at the Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center. This is also addressed in other sources to a similar point, indicating that 
no level of organizational dedication to managing risk as an enterprise can be effective 
without a commonly expressed vision of an organization’s key risk areas and threshold 
definitions of risk. 
 A much more organizational-centric focus is presented by Xin Liu in A Holistic 
Perspective of Enterprise Risk Management (2011), where he posits that enterprise risk 
management techniques could be made more effective if the organization focuses less on 
the identification and resolution of risk, but instead emphasizes that each member of the 
organization “owns” a portion of any risk. This gives each employee an added investment 
in managing risk and sense of responsibility always to be aware of potential risks and 
working to resolve them. This includes working to resolve risks through working across 
departmental boundaries.  
While not always overtly stated, the key principle of enterprise risk management 
that calls for the inclusion of executive level personnel in the risk management process is 
discussed in most literature researched for this thesis. The inclusion of executives as 
stakeholders in risk management automatically adds a more overall enterprise viewpoint 
to the risk management approach, by adding their strategic outlook to the risk discussion. 
Also included and seemingly as critical, however, is the emphasis that all risks must have 
ownership by all portions of an organization to enable the most effective and efficient 
methods of enterprise risk management. Without that holistic ownership of risk, and each 
employee having a sense of responsibility to identify and resolve risks regardless of their 
origin or impact, any enterprise risk management strategy will be ineffective. Here the 
term enterprise is not just a descriptor of the scope of the risk, but also represents that the 
enterprise is responsible for dealing with that risk. 
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2. Risk Management 
 There is much research available in the area of risk management, addressing all 
aspects of the practice. In fact, DOD publishes its own guide to risk management, with 
the latest iteration released in 2015. This guide has the greatest focus on risks within the 
context of a single program, with no mention of enterprise risk management appearing in 
the document. Hardy (2015) has an extensive discussion on viewing risks in relation to 
organizational strategic goals, rather than just a single project’s execution. This is a 
concept that appears to still just be starting to take hold in DOD, despite having been a 
topic discussed in the commercial business world for many years. 
 Viewing or considering risks from an enterprise level is not equivalent to 
managing those risks at an enterprise level. To manage risks at an enterprise level, the 
context of those risks must also be considered. There are several sources that address this 
in a more abstract way, such as a few papers presented as part of Naval Postgraduate 
School Annual Research Symposia. One was Renee Stevens et al.’s (2009) presentation 
which included a discussion regarding risk evaluation that emphasized viewing potential 
risks in the context of the system’s position in the acquisition life-cycle. Another was 
from the 2008 symposium where Gary Langford et al. described that some risks for a 
given system are best resolved not by modifying that system, but instead through 
identifying the risk as a gap in the overall set of service capabilities, thus being better 
resolved as a capability gap to be considered in the acquisition process. Given the DOD 
requirements definition process, this latter concept would inherently force the 
involvement of senior DOD leadership to turn the risk-driven-gap into a new capability 
requirement. 
 Xin Liu (2011) has an interesting discussion about risk management that expands 
on his review of organizational alignment strategies to maximize risk management. This 
includes the assertion that through organizational alignment, ensuring that all members of 
the team feel that they own a portion of the risk management effort, improves a group’s 
ability to manage risks at a more detailed level. This concept is founded on the idea that if 
all internalize that they own a part of risk management, then they will strive to have a 
more detailed understanding of the risks facing the organization. Through this increased 
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“ownership” a more in-depth understanding of risks, their root causes, and their potential 
mitigations will result. Essentially, extending ownership of enterprise risks to all 
members of an organization drives a desire for more detailed descriptions and analyses of 
enterprise risks. 
 Extending that organizational investment concept, Liu (2011) also posits that a 
by-product of the more engaged risk management efforts of the whole team will allow for 
a greater understanding of the impacts of one risk on other risks already being tracked. 
For example, a product running into development delays having an impact on the 
schedule for rolling out a new marketing strategy. Without a whole-team engagement on 
risk management, these risks would be managed separately and with potentially 
orthogonal mitigation approaches. Such as the development risk being managed by the 
engineering team while the marketing schedule risk was being managed independently by 
the marketing team. Instead, a combined risk management effort allows the mitigation of 
the first risk to inform the mitigation strategy on the second risk. This whole concept 
represents an example of the end-game desired when an organization increases focus on 
moving from standard product or project-centered risk management to enterprise risk 
management. 
 Enterprise risk management is also most effective when the overall technical 
effort on a project is performed from an enterprise perspective. This means overarching 
enterprise, or system-of-systems engineering artifacts used both to start the project 
development and design efforts, as well as used as references to validate lower-level 
component design efforts. Karl Brunson et al., in their 2009 A Framework for Systems 
Engineering Development of Complex Systems, state that without those enterprise 
engineering artifacts, it is not possible to have enterprise risk management. The assertion 
is that without an enterprise context for the system, there is no authoritative way to 
measure enterprise risk, or at least enterprise technical risk. Otherwise, some degree of 
measuring the risk at the enterprise level is based on conjecture, since the system is being 
managed at a lower level and that lower level is the only place where there is technical 
certainty in system architecture and design. This idea is critical for enterprise risk 
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management efficacy. It implies the whole system must be managed at the enterprise 
level as a precursor for enterprise risk management. 
 While not frequently acknowledged directly, co-dependence is demonstrated 
between enterprise risk management and organizational alignment in the literature on 
both topics. In the majority of the enterprise risk management principles it is implicit that 
there is organizational buy-in for an enterprise approach not solely to risk management 
but also to system development writ large. This alignment in concepts is a core driver of 
the analysis of the PEO C4I ETRB in the subsequent chapters. 
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The introductory chapter, Chapter I, provided background on the evolution of risk 
management from an individual project level, to an enterprise level. It also discussed 
variations in how organizations in DOD align in product- or function-oriented ways. A 
description of the PEO C4I ETRB is provided, as well as the central research question as 
to whether improvements could be made to the structure and conduct of the ETRB to 
better align it to key organizational alignment and risk management best practices. 
Chapter I also includes a discussion of the analysis methodology that is used to answer 
that research question. 
An overview of high-level organizational structures is covered at the beginning of 
Chapter II. The chapter discusses key principles in aligning organizations for specific 
focus areas, such as risk management. The discussion of these key principles also 
includes a review of how those principles form the criteria that are used to assess the 
ETRB for an effective organizational alignment to enable enterprise risk management. 
Those criteria are then each applied to the ETRB model, and an assessment of the 
ETRB’s compliance is discussed. 
Chapter III performs a similar study as Chapter II, but is on the best practices of 
risk management, with an emphasis specifically on enterprise risk management. The 
chapter includes a discussion on the relatively recent evolution to focus on managing risk 
at the enterprise level, and the benefits that provides to an organization. This involves a 
discussion of those core enterprise risk management tenets, and a review of which of 
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those tenets are chosen as criteria against which the ETRB is evaluated. As in Chapter II, 
Chapter III ends with a review of the ETRB’s adherence to the best practices, and the 
potential impacts to the ETRB’s efficacy that the associated levels of compliance 
indicate. 
From these analyses of individual organizational alignment and risk management 
best practices, an overall review of the ETRB utilization of those best practices is the 
focus of Chapter IV. This review includes a discussion on the impacts of areas of 
alignment or misalignment as well as a discussion on how organizational goals and 
priorities could be driving some of those misalignments. The discussion of organizational 
misalignments is addressed from a holistic level as some potential misalignments may 
have been undertaken with specific intent by the founders of the PEO C4I ETRB. This 
chapter also includes recommendations on steps the ETRB could undertake to move into 
better alignment with both the organizational alignment and enterprise risk management 
best practices. Finally, there is a discussion on the limitations of the analysis and 
recommendations with regard to the ETRB. 
Chapter V provides a summary of the analysis, and describe the conclusions that 
were drawn with regard to the structure and focus of the PEO C4I ETRB. This chapter 




II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
The focus of any organizational structure is to maximize the ability of that 
organization to complete its mission, whether that mission is product development, 
consulting, or the national defense. At a high level, there are two standard structures that 
organizations can adopt: a functional structure or a product-centered structure. Within 
each structure there are different allocations of the three key aspects of each 
organizational position: authority, responsibility, and accountability (Kerzner 2013). 
Briefly, each of these aspects is defined in Table 1, as quoted from Kerzner 
(2013). 
Table 1.   Key Attributes of Organizational Positions. Adapted from 
Kerzner (2013). 
Position Attribute Description 
Authority The power granted to individuals so that they can make 
final decisions 
Responsibility The obligation incurred by individuals in their roles in the 
formal organization to effectively perform assignments 
Accountability Being answerable for the satisfactory completion of a 
specific assignment 
 
It should also be known that in the descriptions, accountability is equated to being 
the combination of authority and responsibility (Kerzner 2013). These attributes are 
important in comparing common organizational structures and how authority, 
responsibility, and accountability are allocated in the various structures. 
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A. COMMON STRUCTURES 
This section examines two standard organizational structures, a functionally 
centered structure and a product-centered structure. It should be emphasized that many 
organizations employ some manner of a hybrid between these two organizational types. 
Referring back to Figure 2, the PEO C4I overall structure is certainly a hybrid, with 
individual program offices that are product-centered but also PEO-level staff that are 
functionally aligned in areas such as engineering, logistics and contracts. The attributes of 
a hybrid organizational structure are a consideration when evaluating the organizational 
structure of the PEO as it relates to the ETRB. The context of the strictly aligned 
organizations discussed in the next section is also important with regard to interpreting 
the potential benefits and drawbacks of the hybrid alignment implemented within the 
PEO as it impacts the scope and set of viewpoints available within the ETRB. 
1. Functional Organizations 
When describing a functional organization the key characteristic is that, “The 
organizational links are primarily among those who perform similar functions” (Ulrich 
and Eppinger 2012). In DOD this is often thought of in very general terms, such as 
technical versus programmatic functions, it can actually be broken down even further. 
Consider a private industry organization and the departments it might have, such as 
finance, marketing, human resources, engineering, test, production and the like. Each of 
these would be considered a separate functional area and in a functional organization 
would be managed by a leadership team within that same functional area. The personnel 
may be assigned to work on individual projects, but their alignment is to their functional 
leadership, not to any project they are working on. They would be loosely coupled, if at 





There are several fundamental strengths associated with functional organizational 
structures. These include: 
• They develop deep specialization and expertise (Ulrich and Eppinger 
2012). 
• They provide better flexibility in utilization of staff (Kerzner 2013). 
• They provide continuity in departmental policies, procedures and 
reporting chains (Kerzner 2013). 
• The have well established and vertical communication channels (Kerzner 
2013). 
• They allow easier budgeting and cost control are possible (Kerzner 2013). 
 
The common thread in each of these strengths ties back to consistency. By 
employing a functionally aligned organizational structure, leadership is also defining an 
organization that looks the same regardless of the projects being undertaken. Personnel 
are aligned by their expertise, not any specific project utilizing that expertise. Due to the 
organizational alignment being more consistent, it is much easier to budget as the 
organizational costs do not fluctuate drastically with changing projects, but rather the 
same personnel are just assigned different project priorities as the project life-cycles carry 
out. With this strong functional alignment, employees report to their single functional 
organization management regardless of how many projects they are assisting with. This 
makes for a much clearer chain of command then if those employees reported to all of 
their disparate project managers. 
Finally, through the strong functional alignment, consistent reporting, and record 
keeping, department policies can be established and utilized by employees for all efforts. 
This is far easier to manage at the individual employee level than if they have different 
policies for each of several projects to which they are contributing, which would result in 
more overhead by doing the same work in a different manner depending on the project. 
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b. Weaknesses 
There are also drawbacks to a functional organization alignment, which include: 
• coordination across functional groups can be difficult and/or slow (Ulrich 
and Eppinger 2012) 
• slower response to changing customer needs (Kerzner 2013) 
• weakly-defined responsibility for overall project execution (Kerzner 2013) 
• ideas for improvement are functionally focused and more difficult to apply 
to individual projects (Kerzner 2013) 
 
Since personnel alignment and thus presumably internal priorities are aligned to a 
functional area and not to any specific project, efforts to coordinate across departments 
within the context of a project are hindered. The idea of project execution is in many 
ways secondary to functional area priorities, resulting in far less emphasis on cross-
functional communication on any single project effort. As a by-product of this, any new 
or changing needs from the customer are addressed more slowly because the changes 
would frequently need the contributions of multiple organizational functions to be 
implemented. 
Also, benefits that result from process improvement efforts would have a slower 
impact on individual projects, as the improvements would be focused on benefitting a 
functional organization as a whole, with benefit to the project as a secondary focus at 
best. This also means that improvement efforts in any one functional area may not match 
with current execution processes in another functional area, resulting in lessened if any 
benefits at the project level. 
Finally, since any project ownership responsibility would be shared across 
multiple functional areas in this organizational alignment, there would be a very weak 
project leadership organization, if any formal project ownership was defined. This may 
not be a major issue for organizations whose products are stable, but for any organization 
looking to evolve existing products, or develop entirely new ones, this weak project 
ownership factor may prove critical. 
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2. Product Organizations 
As the title indicates, product or project organizations are focused on executing 
the full life-cycle of a project to produce a particular product or system. As a result, 
personnel from each necessary functional area are assigned to a product and report 
directly to a product manager. This product manager has full control of all aspects of 
product execution and also full authority to direct all personnel assigned to the product 
(Ulrich and Eppinger 2012). “The major advantage…is that one individual, the program 
manager, maintains complete line authority over the entire project” (Kerzner 2013). In 
many ways this is the converse structure to a functionally aligned organization. 
a. Strengths 
Product centered organizational structures have several advantages, including:  
• It provides for complete control and authority over all aspects of the 
project (Kerzner 2013). 
• Staff maintains expertise on a single project rather than dispersed 
knowledge over several efforts (Kerzner 2013). 
• Cross-functional trade-off analyses can be done more rapidly (Ulrich and 
Eppinger 2012).  
• There is a single focal point for external and customer relations 
(Kerzner 2013). 
Having a single point of responsibility, and equally designated authority, to 
execute a product is the key tenet of a project-aligned organization. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, this results in accountability of product leadership for executing all 
aspects of the product development and delivering the needed product at the conclusion 
of the effort. 
The centralization of accountability at the management level is the first step, but 
to provide the necessary alignment to then execute the product development, a centrally-
aligned staff is necessary. This second aspect of the product manager’s authority is to be 
the direct manager of functional experts assigned to this specific product. This results not 
only in centralized accountability but centralized responsibility for every employee in the 
product organization. 
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Finally, as this product is every team members’ complete focal point, a natural 
relationship between the product organization and external entities is created. This is 
especially crucial in establishing a small set of entry points for the customer base to 
interact with the project organization, resulting in a product that more closely aligns with 
the customer’s needs and vision. 
b. Weaknesses 
There are of course also weaknesses to a product-aligned organization. These are: 
• the ability to keep up with evolution of technology is hindered as technical 
personnel are focused on executing an existing system design (Ulrich and 
Eppinger 2012) 
• the potential limiting factor on long-term career opportunities 
(Kerzner 2013) 
• the tendency to be slow to change personnel as the project moves through 
the life-cycle (Kerzner 2013) 
The tight association with personnel to a specific product is a definite strength 
when their function is providing key input and expertise to a product. As products evolve, 
however, it can be hard to change personnel due to the tight team identity that has already 
been established. This, for example, could result in design engineers being kept on a 
product even once it is in full production and different engineering skillsets could be 
more valuable. 
Relatedly, since personnel become synonymous with the product on which they 
are working, it can be difficult for product staff to take advantage of advancement 
opportunities. They become identified only in terms of their product affiliation, not for 
their functional skillsets, and so hiring managers may have difficulty imagining them 
contributing functional knowledge to a product with a different end goal. 
Finally, as staff focus on a specific product, and on executing a vision defined 
early in the life-cycle, it can be difficult for them to incorporate technical advances or 
other industry changes. The product team has a vision that was created largely from their 
inputs, and it can become an issue of personal pride if significant changes are proposed 
due to industry evolution. 
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3. Considerations for the PEO C4I ETRB 
As discussed in the overview of the PEO C4I organization in Chapter I, the ETRB 
is chaired by the APEO-Engineering, who leads the PEO C4I functionally aligned 
engineering organization. Included in this organization are Assistant Program Managers-
Engineering (APM-E) that are engineering core staff but are embedded in the PEO C4I 
program management organizations. A similar construct is followed for the PEO logistics 
staff.  
The result of this is a functionally aligned organization running the ETRB, but 
utilizing personnel that are embedded in the program management product-aligned 
organizations is an interesting hybrid organizational structure that influences the ETRB. 
The APEO-E provides engineering oversight for all PEO C4I activities. This authority is 
also delegated to the APM-E staff, but that group spends their day-to-day efforts 
embedded in the product-aligned program offices, giving them a very different view on 
technical risks in particular than may be available at the PEO level. A depiction of the 




Figure 3.  Core Functional and Product-Aligned Portions of PEO C4I 
Organization. Adapted from PEO C4I (2014). 
The impacts of this hybrid organizational alignment also needs to be a 
consideration as the ETRB is evaluated against the organizational alignment principles 
that are discussed in the next section. This organizational structure could be placing 
limitations on the ETRB, or it could be providing needed and desired focus on the 
engineering aspects of risk management. Limitations of this construct for the ETRB 
should be considered, but it should also be determined if those limitations were 
implemented intentionally by leadership. 
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B. RISK MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURES 
The overarching organizational constructs defined in the previous section and the 
strengths and weaknesses associated with each, as well as how those organizational 
constructs relate to the structure of the PEO C4I ETRB were used as context for the 
evaluation in this thesis. Given those considerations, an examination of key 
organizational alignment principles related to enterprise risk management was performed. 
They were compared against the key concepts of authority, responsibility and 
accountability as described in functional and project centered organizations. 
1. Employee Responsibility and Accountability 
As defined earlier in this chapter, accountability is composed of authority and 
responsibility, “Being answerable for the satisfactory completion of a specific 
assignment” (Kerzner 2013). Based on that definition, accountability is in context of the 
employee’s assignment. If this were an employee in a functionally aligned organization, 
that function could be a specific engineering, or marketing, or other task that the 
employee repeated with regularity though potentially on many disparate projects. Were 
the employee in a product-aligned organization, the assignment could be any number of 
tasks focused on a particular aspect of a product, or a particular function within the 
product life-cycle. This may include engineering analysis on any number of tradeoff 
studies, or marketing for different versions of a product produced by the organization. 
Liu (2011) postulated that enterprise risk management would be more effective if 
an organization imbued each employee with the responsibility to manage risks, and not 
just risks in their own area but in all areas of a company or product. This responsibility to 
manage all potential risks, and the authority to help develop mitigations, would make 
each employee more accountable for risk management as a whole. With that 
accountability would come an increased dedication to risk management and therefore 
greater success at managing risk at an enterprise level. In fact, that increased authority 
may be considered a pre-requisite for implementing enterprise risk management (ERM), 
“ERM requires risk owners at the operational level to have considerable knowledge, 
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communication, control, and authority which are reserved for managers in a traditional 
risk management system” (Liu 2011). 
This principle was selected as an evaluation criteria since it was the most 
fundamental organizational concept to enable enterprise risk management. It would be 
impossible for an organization to profess an effort to manage risks at an enterprise level 
yet have only a subset of its employees charged with managing risks as part of their 
responsibilities. To truly infuse an organization with the goal of managing risks at the 
enterprise level each employee must inherently understand that such an effort includes 
every employee at every level. Without that stipulation, any enterprise risk management 
effort is not encompassing the entire organization.  
2. Cross-team Coordination 
Providing employees with the responsibility to manage enterprise risks could have 
other organizational benefits as well. “Coordination and interactions…among risk owners 
or co-owners are important for a successful ERM program. For example, coordination of 
risk discussions across the entire entity may reduce risk owners’ tendency to refuse to 
share information and hide its negative impact” (Liu 2011, 14). From earlier in this 
chapter, the benefit of increased cross-team interactions is also a foundational benefit of 
operating in a project-aligned organization. It would be an interesting study to research 
how effective this aspect of enterprise risk management would be in a functionally 
aligned organization, where cross-team interaction is an assumed weakness. 
“ERM challenges the status quo and requires managers and leaders to step out of 
their organizational comfort zones and into a collaborative environment to not only 
discuss common risks but uncover latent risks as well” (Hardy 2015, 29). This principle 
of enterprise risk management leverages the concept of imbuing each employee with the 
responsibility of enterprise risk management. By issuing that priority, employees need to 
better understand the enterprise within which they are operating, and thus it results in 
more cross-team communication. That is the first step toward coordination; making that 
transition into cross-team coordination includes having enterprise level definitions of risk 
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management methods. The methods and overall enterprise risks are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Assuming the implementation of the first criteria is complete, the next step in 
managing risks as an enterprise involves communication among all the entities in an 
organization that constitute that enterprise. Therefore, assessing an organization’s 
construct and how it enables or even encourages cross-team coordination on not only risk 
but any other core area of the organization is a crucial indicator as to whether the 
organizational construct is set up to enable enterprise risk management.  
3. Multiple Team Risk Ownership 
Continuing the evolution of having employees take responsibility for the 
enterprise level management of risks to then coordinating across teams to manage risks is 
the principle that enterprise risks should actually be owned by multiple teams. This 
evolution is beyond just managing or mitigating a risk as a team, but having employee 
and managerial ownership for resolving the risk. This is the ultimate in responsibility and 
accountability, and drives the next level of individual investment in enterprise risk 
management as it is not just your singular responsibility but that of your whole team and 
that team’s management. 
“Strategic risk is not likely to have a single risk owner because it crosses multiple 
units, including manufacturing, marketing, and finance” (Liu 2011, 22). Risks at an 
organizationally strategic level are something rarely emphasized in standard project-level 
risk management, especially as outlined in the DOD Risk Management Guide in 2015. If 
a risk is at a strategic level, it requires actions from multiple functional areas to fully 
address, thus requiring that it be owned by multiple teams and given equal priority by 
each of those teams. To be able to understand what an organization views as strategic 
risks, managerial definition of areas of strategic importance is necessary. 
The progression of organizationally enabling multiple teams to own responsibility 
for mitigating risks builds upon the previous two organizational alignment principles. 
This progression is not possible without the foundation of assigning each employee the 
responsibility of managing enterprise risks, and setting up a communication structure that 
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enables cross-team coordination on risk activities. The ability to have multiple teams co-
manage a risk indicates an optimized organization in regards both to individual risk 
management responsibilities and to a common methodology for identifying and defining 
risks in general. These enterprise risk management principles are discussed in the next 
chapter. Only with complimentary organizational alignment principles and well-defined 
risk management methods could multiple teams own the same risk without any concern 
for attempting to mitigate it in significantly different manners.  
4. Enterprise Definition of Risk Management Practices and Risk Areas 
If multiple parts of an organization are going to own and mitigate enterprise risks 
collaboratively, it is imperative that the organization have a global set of criteria to 
evaluate potential risks against. This is often an issue organizations face when trying to 
implement enterprise risk management. Barriers such as these were discovered when the 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport attempted such an effort. “Risk management 
was found to be inconsistently applied from department to department and from project 
to project within a department” (Galliano 2011, 6). If risks are managed across 
departments but each department has a different definition of what qualifies as a risk, or 
how to prioritize those risks, the ability to manage the diverse set of risks in any 
consistent manner is significantly hampered. 
Relatedly, defining organization-wide areas of potential risk is critical to keeping 
all entities within the organization focused on the same varieties of risk. “The danger is 
that lower-level management choices are more of a reflection of their parochial interests 
than they are a reflection of what is best for the whole” (Roberts 1991, 23). To align 
organizationally for enterprise risk management, this issue of departmental silos must be 
addressed at a more fundamental level, such as by ensuring each employee has individual 
responsibility for managing enterprise risk as described earlier in this chapter. Beyond 
that allocation of responsibility is a managerial definition of strategic risks of which all 
departments must be aware. To that end, it also encourages departments to look beyond 
their own organizational boundaries to examine what risks exist in other areas that may 
have enterprise impact. 
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While personal responsibility and team alignment to risk mitigation 
responsibilities are key enablers to enterprise risk management, a true enterprise approach 
can only succeed if there are common risk management processes followed by all 
portions of the organization. This portion of the criterion is an emphasis on risk 
mitigation strategies, which can include common procedures as well as ancillary 
functions such as communications plans or a regular schedule of risk review boards. 
The second part of the criterion is an emphasis that enterprise risk management 
can also benefit from organizational leadership identifying key areas of potential risk for 
all portions of the enterprise to consider as part of their risk mitigation efforts. While this 
research discusses approaches that mostly focus on bottom-up risk identification and 
enterprise management, it is just as beneficial for the highest echelons of the organization 
to identify all-encompassing potential risk areas for which functional and product teams 
must be aware. 
5. Evaluating Risks in Areas Other Than Your Own 
Presuming that an overall organizational definition of risk management practices 
and key sources of risk have been identified, implementing enterprise risk management 
allows lessons learned from mitigating risks in one functional area or on one project to be 
utilized in other areas of the organization. “Internal communication is essential to the 
success of ERM, senior management should pay extra attention to the establishment of 
reporting lines…so that any information on risk management provided by a business unit 
leader can be analyzed and compared with what was learned from other divisions” 
(Tonello 2007, 42). 
This ability to capture past, successful risk management strategies from across the 
organization provides a foundation for allowing certain types of risks to be managed as a 
committee with various managers bringing their own risk mitigation expertise to bear. 
This also allows those managers to utilize the strategies that have provided the greatest 
past impact for risk mitigation from other departments in the organization. Some private 
companies actually employ an enterprise risk management executive committee, “A 
specialized executive committee funnels the diverse intellectual contributions of 
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functional managers to the [Chief Risk Officer]…functional managers work directly with 
business unit managers; by means of the committee they should be able to voice at the 
executive level any concerns expressed by lower organizational levels” (Tonello 
2007, 39). 
This criterion is the culmination of the previous four criteria in many ways. 
Leveraging individual responsibility to consider risks in the enterprise context, 
organizing teams to share ownership of risks, and having leadership identify both 
methods for risk management as well as potential enterprise risks requiring attention 
build to enable the concept that through this shift in mindset and sudden awareness of 
other areas of focus, individuals or teams could start to notice risk in areas outside of 
their organization. This cross-organization ability to recognize and manage risks should 
be the ultimate goal of any enterprise risk management effort because this is the full 
integration of all of the prior criteria. 
C. ANALYSIS OF POSITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PEO C4I ETRB 
Utilizing the key organizational principles associated with successful enterprise 
risk management implementation, the alignment of the PEO C4I ETRB was assessed. 
The degree to which the ETRB implements the core organizational foci to enable 
enterprise risk management are reviewed in this section. 
1. Employee Responsibility and Accountability 
The ETRB charter assigns responsibilities to several groups, including the Chair, 
Members, Advisors, Submitters, Risk Owners, Board Secretariat, and ETRB Working 
Group (PEO C4I 2015). From that list alone, it is simple to conclude that the 
responsibility and accountability for risk management is assigned to the Risk Owner. The 
charter does not specify who can be assigned as a risk owner, so the assumption is it 
could be anyone in the PEO. 
A closer reading of the role descriptions, however, indicates some other 
participants who have risk mitigation responsibilities. For all the following entries, an 
ETR is an Enterprise Technical Risk. These functions include: 
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• ETRB Chair—“Assign an owner for each ETR to manage all details 
pertaining to that ETR” (PEO C4I 2015, 4).  
• ETRB Members—“Provide technical feedback, analysis and 
recommendations on submitted ETRs” (PEO C4I 2015, 5). 
• ETRB Advisors—“Provide technical feedback, analysis, and 
recommendation on proposed ETRs, disposition, mitigation strategy, and 
mitigation status” (PEO C4I 2015, 5). 
• ETR Owner—“Maintain the description and/or mitigation plan, to ensure 
accuracy, completeness, and currency, providing updates to ETR records 
as changes happen” (PEO C4I 2015, 5). 
• ETRB Working Group—“The ETRB Working Group convenes weekly or 
as needed to preview ETR submission and conduct detailed review of 
open ETRs” (PEO C4I 2015, 5). 
 
Given all those various participants that have a direct or indirect role in risk 
ownership in the ETRB, the assessment of compliance to organizational principles for 
enterprise risk management is less straight-forward. Table 2 provides a summary 
comparison of the PEO C4I ETRB alignment to assigning employees responsibility for 
enterprise risk management. 
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The ETRB description of roles indicates several groups, all listed earlier in this 
section, as having some degree of responsibility for risk ownership and risk management. 
This is a potential area of confusion as there is a possibility of multiple groups within the 
ETRB assuming ownership of a given ETR. Conversely, there is an equal possibility of 
multiple groups assuming one of the other constituencies is taking responsibility for a 
risk which may result in none of the roles taking ownership. This approach does provide 
benefits in terms of involving multiple roles and multiple areas of expertise in mitigating 
enterprise risks, but it should be clear how overall risk mitigation is being managed to 
ensure effective risk mitigation,. How this risk mitigation management is accomplished is 
discussed later in this section with regard to the Multiple Team Risk Ownership criterion. 
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2. Cross-team Coordination 
Reviewing the PEO C4I ETRB membership list includes mandatory members 
within the PEO C4I engineering functional organization, including the APEO-E, the two 
Deputy APEO-Es and the APM-Es that are embedded within each of the product-aligned 
program offices within the PEO. Beyond the engineering functional area, ETRB advisory 
members include acquisition staff from the program offices, ship baseline managers from 
the ship integration staff as well as members of the PEO test, evaluation and certification 
staff. 
While all of these roles are listed as members, they are not necessarily mandated 
to attend each ETRB, nor is there any description of the process for determining which 
members are assigned to own and manage risks. Having expertise from multiple areas is 
desired for enterprise risk management, but a consistent definition of responsibilities is 
also needed to ensure consistent management of risks. Examining the expertise of the 
roles associated with the ETRB, an assessment of the board’s ability to enable cross-team 
coordination is possible. Table 3 provides a summary of this assessment. 
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Similar to the evaluation of the first organizational alignment criterion, the PEO 
C4I ETRB charter defines the involvement of personnel with engineering, acquisition, 
installation, and test/certification expertise, so the framework for cross-team management 
of risks is present. What is less clear is how the assignment of responsibility among 
individuals and teams is performed to help ensure the clear definition of risk management 
responsibility and the associated teams involved. A few minor changes, or a new process 
definition section within the ETRB charter would be a good way to address this question. 
3. Multiple Team Risk Ownership 
The next step beyond cross-team coordination for the purposes of providing the 
most comprehensive knowledge base for managing risks is the concept of multiple teams 
or functional areas actually owning enterprise risks and being fully responsible for their 
management and mitigation. This is an area where the ETRB charter is largely silent. 
Defining a risk owner is mentioned as an overall goal of the ETRB, and the ETRB chair 
has the specific responsibility to assign an ETR owner (PEO C4I 2015). However, a 
review of the responsibilities of the ETR Owner reveals that they: 
• [are] designated by the ETRB Chair 
• ensure that ETR is captured in Risk Exchange 
• maintain the description and/or mitigation plan, to ensure accuracy, 
completeness, and currency, providing updates to ETR records as changes 
happen. (PEO C4I 2015) 
 
These are important responsibilities, but none ensures actual mitigation of the risk 
or management of it other than ensuring it is being tracked and updates are provided. 
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It may be intentional that the ETRB desires only a single team to have ownership 
of any given ETR, or it may be assumed that multi-team ownership is implied. To ensure 
cross-team buy in and support for either ownership structure, it should be made explicit 
in the ETRB charter so that organizations can be prepared to engage at the proper level. 
4. Enterprise Definition of Risk Management Practices and Risk Areas 
For cross-team discussion of risks, and multiple team ownership of risks, the organization 
as a whole must have a common set of risk practices that all teams and functional areas 
follow. Without this common set of practices, it would be increasingly difficult to 
manage risks as more parts of the organization become involved. Each part of the 
organization would have its own ways of defining risks, its own hierarchy of mitigation 
strategies, and its own definitions of what amounted to mitigation in terms of risks. 
Additionally, to aid the various parts of an organization in considering risks at an 
enterprise level, it would be beneficial to have the upper levels of organizational 
management define areas they are most focused on in terms of tracking risk. This gives 
each segment of the organization a starting point for considering potential enterprise risk 
areas. 
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In the context of the ETRB charter, the only mention of more senior groups in the 
organization is the ability of the ETRB to elevate risks if needed. The ETRB Chair shall, 
“Escalate ETRs to the SEB [Systems Engineering Board] and/or PGB [Portfolio 
Governance Board] when appropriate” (PEO C4I 2015, 4). Within PEO C4I, the SEB is 
the most senior technical adjudication board, and the PGB the most senior acquisition and 
programmatic board. The presence of these more senior boards indicates the potential for 
more senior involvement in ETRs is available, though there is not an expectation it be 
regularly used. The reverse appears to also be true from the ETRB charter, in that there is 
no mention of more senior-level guidance of risk areas the ETRB should be particularly 
focused on, instead leaving it to whatever risks the ETRB members and advisors choose 
to nominate. Table 5 provides a summary evaluation of the ETRB against this 
organizational criterion. 
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This particular evaluation criterion has the most room for interpretation in regards 
to implementation strategy. The scope of the ETRB has an emphasis on technical risk 
management at an enterprise level, so the lack of continuing involvement by more senior 
boards may not actually be an issue, but a result of intentional design.  
5. Evaluating Risks in Areas Other Than Your Own 
This organizational alignment principle for enterprise risk management is a 
natural extension of the first principle of having each employee instilled with the 
responsibility to manage enterprise risks. To manage enterprise risks, the risks must not 
only be viewed for their impacts beyond a single area, but in a more enterprise context. 
Beyond this, risks from other areas should also be reviewed both for potential impact to a 
functional area, and for the betterment of the enterprise writ large. 
The meeting business rules of the ETRB indicate that all members have a role in 
evaluating every risk that comes before the ETRB. “All members are expected to review, 
assess, and provide comments on ETRs prior to the meeting” (PEO C4I 2015, 6). By 
definition, this means all ETRB members, the functionally aligned engineering staff, are 
evaluating all risks that come to the ETRB regardless of their origin. If this is paired with 
those ETRB members feeling that they have the responsibility to evaluate and manage 
risks at an enterprise level, as defined in organizational principle #1, then this mechanism 
for having the engineering staff review every nominated ETR is very effective at 
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This is the criterion with which the ETRB seems most aligned. The meeting rules 
indicate every member shall review every ETR and provide input. The main potential 
issue with this set up within the ETRB is whether every member truly does review every 
ETR, and what variation in perspectives is available during that review since the only 
mandated members are from the engineering functional area. The impacts of the potential 
membership limitation are discussed further in Chapter IV. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter included an overview of the two fundamental styles of organizational 
alignment, specifically functionally aligned organizations and product-aligned 
organizations. This also involved a review of benefits and drawbacks to each style of 
alignment and a discussion on how PEO C4I is a hybrid of both styles. The program 
offices are product focused, with an emphasis on acquiring or producing specific product 
lines within the context of a certain set of warfighting tasks, such as Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, or Command and Control. To complement these 
product-aligned program offices, the PEO also includes a set of front office staff who are 
functionally aligned, each reporting to a functional lead with either a Deputy PEO or 
Assistant PEO title.  
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There was also an overview of the PEO C4I ETRB as it related to this hybrid 
organizational structure within the PEO, to include considerations for alignment of 
functionally focused engineering staff as the core members of the ETRB, with personnel 
with other functional expertise utilized either from other PEO staff offices, or the 
product-centered program offices to support the ETRB as desired. The impacts of this 
organizational alignment are revisited in the context of the compliance of the ETRB with 
core organizational alignment principles to enable enterprise risk management in Chapter 
IV. 
The chapter included a review of key organizational alignment principles that 
would support implementation of enterprise risk management, first introduced in Chapter 
1 and expanded upon in this chapter. A further discussion of the origin of the principles 
was provided, including the research that surrounded their selection as evaluation criteria 
in this thesis.  
These criteria were there applied to the PEO C4I ETRB. The key point for 
evaluation was a comparison of the main tenet of the organizational alignment principle 
with the content of the ETRB charter. Some effort was made to understand items not 
explicitly in the charter, but implied, as well as to account for activities that were spelled 
out as possible actions in the charter but without specified standard operating procedures. 
Each of the five criteria was repeated, with an ideal case for implementation, then a 
description of how the ETRB did or did not implement that principle, and a conclusion on 
level of implementation by the ETRB. 
A degree of evaluation was performed in terms of considerations for how the 
ETRB might more fully implement a given organizational alignment principle, as well as 
some discussion on the potential limitations placed on the ETRB based on its chosen 
implementation strategy. Several of the criteria directly related to the ETRB receiving 
more senior level guidance on organizational priorities for enterprise risk management. 
Further evaluation on the impacts of the ETRB’s level of implementation of the 
key principles is covered in Chapter IV. This includes not only potential consequences 
with regards to the ETRB’s effectiveness, but also discussions on how to adjust the 
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ETRB to be more complaint with the organizational alignment principles. Chapter IV 
also takes some of the conclusions drawn here in this chapter and discusses why those 
limitations may have been implemented with intent, to specifically limit the potential 
scope of the ETRB. 
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III. ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
While Chapter II focused on how organizational principles could be adjusted to 
better support enterprise risk management, it is equally important for an organization to 
employ the proper enterprise risk management principles. Many discussions of risk 
management focus on risk mitigation efforts within the bounds of a single product. Even 
if the product team has members from multiple functional areas, the considerations of 
risk end at the boundaries of the product team’s area of responsibility, or at the boundary 
of the product itself. Expanding those areas of consideration for risk management 
requires changing the team perspective on risk, which is achieved through increased 
attention to and implementation of the principles of enterprise risk management. 
A. CORE PRINCIPLES 
While it would be overly simplistic to say the only difference between standard 
risk management and enterprise risk management is the word enterprise, that comparison 
may do a better job of demonstrating the contrast than anticipated. Somewhat 
appropriately, Merriam Webster’s Dictionary definition of the word enterprise is, “A 
project or undertaking that is especially difficult, complicated, or risky.” An alternate 
definition is, “A unit of economic organization or activity; especially: a business 
organization.” Combining these two definitions yields an undertaking that is complicated 
and risky and related to a business organization. Extrapolating slightly beyond that 
definition would yield a description of enterprise risk management as an effort to 
examine risks for the entirety of a business organization, and likely a business 
organization existing in an arena that is inherently risky. 
Fundamentally, Tonello (2007) expresses enterprise risk management as the effort 
of elevating risk discussions to a strategic level. As is discussed later in this chapter, 
elevating the risk discussion in that manner can help not only with managing risks in an 
enterprise context, but with that leadership perspective, one also views risks for their 
potential to serve as opportunities. While much of Tonello’s (2007) research was in the 
domain of private industry, several of his observations are just as applicable to the 
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government. It was asserted that in most businesses the majority of risk management was 
handled at the individual business unit level, thus resulting in a bottoms-up risk 
management approach. “This means it is often left to the discretion of the single business 
unit to assess the relevance of a risk issue and decide if it requires an immediate 
mitigation response and if it should be raised to higher ranks in the chain of command or 
should simply be disregarded as immaterial” (Tonello 2007, 16). 
While this approach also has its merits, it can be subject to the blind spots of an 
individual business unit, or an individual project team within an overall organization. 
Risks that seem immaterial to one group could indeed be critical to another if risk 
management extended beyond team boundaries. “With ERM, this approach is inverted 
and managing risk becomes a cohesive on-going activity led by senior management and 
overseen by the corporate board” (Tonello 2007, 16). While government entities may not 
have a corporate board, as previously discussed in Figure 2, the ETRB is managed at the 
PEO staff level which is comparable to a corporate board. Therefore, this is a seemingly 
good foundation for the group under review. 
Beyond the enterprise approach to risk management, one must consider the 
cascading impacts of risks, such as the more components that are involved in developing 
a system, both organizational and physical, the more likely it is that risks in one area of 
the system will impact or cause risks in another area of the system. “Developing and 
delivering complex systems requires the management of complex risks” (Brunson et al. 
2009, 7). The more complex the risks, the more likely they are to cross organizational 
boundaries and require management and mitigation strategies from an enterprise 
perspective. Said another way, “Managing risk within one’s own work scope without 
thinking of other departments or the whole company may increase total risk for the whole 
company” (Liu 2011, 21). 
Finally, even by accepting the idea that by elevating the risk management 
conversation to the enterprise level, an item that may have been considered a risk by one 
business unit may actually be considered an opportunity by the enterprise. There are 
broader implications in the area of DOD acquisition. These include the idea that most 
modern DOD systems acquisition is based on the foundation of gaps in current 
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warfighting capability, or more simply, capability risks that need to be mitigated. Framed 
another way, risks in an existing system could instead be viewed as enterprise capability 
gaps for consideration of new system development via the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) process. As described in the JCIDS instruction, “Validated 
capability requirement documents then drive the development, procurement and fielding 
of materiel and non-materiel solutions that satisfy the validated capability requirements 
and close or mitigate associated capability gaps” (CJCSI 2015, A-1). 
Examination of a warfighting capability gap is one of the first steps in the 
development of a new military system. “The metrics of Gap Analysis are defined on the 
basis of system value and assessed risks” (Langford et al. 2008, 11). Therefore, from a 
DOD perspective, a risk to one program may be an opportunity to create another 
program, one tailored to address just that risk. Examining risks at the enterprise level 
within DOD could help enable the more effective use of acquisition resources. Do not 
address that risk in the program that discovered it, benefiting only the user base of that 
discovering system. Instead develop a specialized solution to address that risk for all 
warfighters. 
B. RELATIONSHIP OF CORE PRINCIPLES TO ENTERPRISE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Utilizing the overarching principles discussed in the previous section, six criteria 
were derived to be used in evaluating how a risk management organization adheres to the 
core principles of enterprise risk management. These six criteria are discussed over the 
next several sections. 
1. Ability to Consider Short-Term and Long-Term Impacts of Risks 
In a risk management strategy that is limited to a single product, or even to a 
single effort within a product, risks are assessed for impact solely on that product. Thus 
the impact assessment is typically just considered in the short term, relatively speaking. 
One of the fundamentals of approaching risk from an enterprise perspective is that the 
company, or departments, that comprise the enterprise will continue to exist beyond any 
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given individual product. Therefore, all risks considered at the enterprise level must be 
considered in both short and long term contexts.  
Therefore, a risk discovered today, should be evaluated for potential impact for 
current products as is standard in any risk management environment, but it must also be 
evaluated for its potential impact on the enterprise as a whole both for other on-going 
projects as well as for future investment opportunities. “Given its emphasis on strategy, 
ERM can help the corporation find a better balance between loss-prevention, risk 
mitigation efforts and risk-taking, entrepreneurial endeavors” (Tonello 2007, 7). 
Later in this section there is a wider discussion on the use of risks for potential 
future investment, or in DOD context, for examining risks as inputs to gap analysis 
activities for future projects. From a general enterprise risk management approach, 
however, this evaluation metric is representative of one of the most fundamental tenets of 
managing risks at an enterprise level. This criterion evaluates an organization’s ability to 
look at risks beyond just current efforts, but rather for broader impacts not only to other 
projects, but to the organizational body as a whole. 
2. Evaluating a New Risk with Regard to its Impact on Existing Risks 
It sounds intuitive to say that a newly discovered risk could have impacts on risks 
already in the risk management system. Despite that, this is not something specified in 
the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition. This is also discussed as a potential 
limitation in organizational alignment research, “Managing risk within one’s own work 
scope without thinking of other departments or the whole company may increase total 
risk for the whole company” (Liu 2011, 21). 
As Liu (2011) says more directly, “A given risk influences other risks.” This 
concept appears to be very straightforward and foundational, and yet it again is not 
something covered in any depth in DOD risk management guidelines. Also, as was 
discussed in the previous section, if an organization is only examining risks within the 
context of a specific project or a specific timeline, then consideration of other enterprise 
risks that fall outside of either of those parameters would not be considered in relation to 
any newly nominated risks. 
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Building from the first criterion to consider risks in both short and long term 
phases of a project or enterprise, this is a logical second criterion. If risks are being 
considered beyond the boundaries of a single project, then comparing them to risks on 
other enterprise efforts should be the next level of implementation for an enterprise risk 
management structure. In this context, risk management efforts on projects from all 
aspects of the enterprise should be utilizing risk registries or other risk tracking systems 
from all other projects or efforts within the same enterprise. This provides the necessary 
information to compare new risks in one area against existing risks in any other area, 
presuming both an enterprise risk management mindset as well as the ability to share risk 
information across the enterprise in a common context. 
3. Risks Managed at the Most Detailed Level Possible 
In order to truly understand impacts of risks on the enterprise as a whole, it is 
critical to be able to understand all potential risks at the greatest level of detail available. 
Liu  (2011) performed a significant amount of psychologically-centric research within the 
context of enterprise risk management and found that many people look at vague events 
as having vague impacts. Put another way, the less detail there is associated with a risk, 
the less detail will likely be associated with the consequences of that risk, and thus 
dependencies on or from other aspects of the enterprise will be abstracted away and the 
risk will not receive the focus it needs for proper mitigation strategies to be developed. 
This would be especially true of risks where specific mitigation steps require 
cooperation from other aspects of the enterprise. Without defining these mitigation efforts 
in detail, the enterprise dependencies or implications would not be detected. “In the ERM 
context, a high-level construal of paying taxes might be [described as] complying with 
IRS regulations and avoiding regulation risk, whereas a low-level construal of this 
activity might focus on details such as the tax deductions, the tax payments and the filing 
deadlines” (Liu 2011, 24). Using this example, if the risk statement was focused on 
avoiding a tax audit, then the high-level risk mitigation would simply be to pay the 
required taxes. This reads as a very simple activity and would be classified as having a 
high consequence but low likelihood in most standard risk models. Examining the 
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specific steps needed to pay the required taxes includes the low-level detailed activities 
that must be completed. These detailed mitigations include 1) calculating the deductions, 
which in an enterprise context could result in new risks ensuring there were staff on hand 
with knowledge of tax law; or 2) making the tax payments on time, which might yield 
another risk as to whether there was an existing communications mechanism between the 
department that calculated the tax payment and the department that actually submitted the 
payment. 
For this criterion to effectively manage risks at an enterprise level, one must 
define risks and the associated mitigation efforts at a very detailed level. Without this 
specific description of the risk and mitigation steps, the execution of the previous two 
criteria will be very difficult. A risk manager cannot evaluate short and long term impacts 
of a given risk if the efforts that will be undertaken to mitigate the risk cannot be 
expressed in a context that associates temporal impacts with the mitigation efforts. 
Additionally, the impact of a risk in one area of the enterprise on risks in other areas of 
the enterprise cannot be assessed if all the risks are at a very abstracted level. Using the 
tax example from earlier in this section, just describing the risk as being a negative 
impact if taxes were not paid on time would not be nearly enough detail for an enterprise 
to examine the communication paths between the financial department determining the 
tax burden and the department making the tax payments. Having detailed risk definitions 
and detailed risk mitigation efforts are a mandatory precursor to being able to employ 
enterprise risk management techniques. 
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4. Presence of Enterprise Engineering Models or Architectures to 
Provide Objective Context for Technical Risk 
To provide the necessary detail described with the previous criterion, an overall 
context of the system or organizational construct is a key artifact that must already be 
defined. To put risks in context of an overall system, system-of-systems, enterprise, or 
other larger construct, that large construct must have a definition that is common for all 
participants. In the case of enterprise risk, this could be an enterprise engineering model 
to provide reference for technical risks, or more generically, an enterprise architecture. 
Enterprise architecture is often described in a technical, system architecture focus, 
specifically with regard to Information Technology systems. Enterprise architecture, 
however, can also be a vital tool for determining system dependencies, whether through 
system-to-system interfaces or system-to-stakeholder interfaces. One of the chief sources 
of technical risks for newly developed systems is the failure to adhere to industry 
standards or specifications in defining interfaces and data exchange models (Tse 2016). 
Having a defined overall system enterprise-level architecture is required to be 
able to define technical risks in adequate detail to analyze them for enterprise impacts. 
“Acquisition life-cycle decisions can be potentially flawed if the systems engineering 
development model isn’t appropriately matched to the complex system being developed” 
(Brunson et al. 2009, 7). It is very difficult to determine impacts across an enterprise of 
systems, and therefore difficult to employ enterprise risk management efforts if that 
enterprise is not commonly defined. 
5. Risks Evaluated with Context of System Position in Acquisition Life-
Cycle 
The methods that would be used to mitigate a risk vary depending on where the 
subject system is in its development life-cycle. A system still in the planning and design 
stages that has a dependency risk related to an interface with an external system has 
several paths available for mitigating that risk. If that same interface risk is not 
discovered until final system testing though, the available mitigation options are far more 
limited and almost certainly more expensive. Given recent DOD emphasis on rapid 
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prototyping and fielding of capabilities (Pomerleau 2016), the chances of risks being 
discovered for the first time late in the life-cycle increase substantially. Mitigating the 
impacts of discovering risks late in the life-cycle could be aided through the employment 
of enterprise risk management techniques. “These systems [information technology 
systems] are often intended to operate in highly volatile environments and, thus, are 
subject to changing user needs and expectations” (Stevens et al. 2009, 75). Examining 
risks in both the short- and long-term contexts, evaluating those risks in the context of 
other existing risks, and ensuring that risks and mitigations are described in sufficient 
detail, from the time a risk is first raised, should all be done within awareness of the 
system’s current phase within the development life-cycle. 
Given this, it is not sufficient only to evaluate risks with regards to their potential 
enterprise impact. The ability for a system to mitigate a risk, given the system’s position 
in the development life-cycle, should also be a consideration. “For these systems 
[systems where change is inevitable], there is a risk that requirements are locked in too 
early and may not be responsive to legitimately changing user needs and that 
technologies become outdated while the system is still in development” (Stevens et al. 
2009, 75). The mitigation for a risk discovered in one system may actually be executed 
by a different system within the enterprise to lower the life-cycle impact on the original 
system, where the risk was discovered.  
While the previous enterprise risk management evaluation criteria focused on the 
ability to define and mitigate risks outside the boundaries of one specific project yet 
within the enterprise, this criterion instead is focused on ensuring a consideration of how 
to best mitigate a given risk includes the context of the system’s stage in its overall life-
cycle. Just as defining a new risk’s impacts on other risks could yield a mitigation in 
System B for a risk found by System A, a similar impact could be driven by life-cycle 
considerations. An interface risk between Systems A and B, found by System A as it is 
going through final test, could be mitigated more effectively and efficiently for the whole 
enterprise if System B is earlier in its development life-cycle. A key component for being 
able to make such an evaluation is an overall enterprise architecture, which could be used 
for helping to identify these interfaces and dependencies between systems. This is 
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another example of these enterprise risk management principles being closely related. 
The ability of a risk management approach to consider these other facets of a risk beyond 
just the risk statement is critical to effective enterprise risk management. 
6. Assessment of Ability to Mitigate Risk in Current Enterprise 
Architecture 
A final consideration in enterprise risk management is that the most appropriate or 
effective way to mitigate a risk within the enterprise could be to expand the enterprise 
itself. One of the foundations for determining the scope of new DOD programs is 
identifying capabilities not already provided by existing systems, “The metrics of Gap 
Analysis are defined on the basis of system value and assessed risks” (Langford et al. 
2008, 11). In this case, the assessed risk could be from a predecessor system that was 
unable to meet all of its capabilities, or perhaps in fulfilling its requirements exposed a 
new gap in capability that was not considered previously. 
Frequently, these gaps in capability are defined in terms of risks to a core DOD 
mission set. Whether it be an actual system vulnerability or a potential threat from an 
adversary, the capability gaps are often defined in terms of risk to the overall force, a 
fundamental enterprise risk. “The risks are a function of the threats and vulnerabilities, 
where threats are typed by magnitudes and frequencies, and vulnerabilities are 
determined by the likelihoods of success” (Langford et al. 2008, 20). 
Therefore, the final criterion for evaluating an organization’s enterprise risk 
management implementation is to determine if it is capable of evaluating enterprise risks 
as risks that should not be addressed by the current enterprise, but rather a risk that 
should require a change or expansion of the enterprise. This is the capstone of 
determining either enterprise system or organizational limitations, and indicates that all 
the prior enterprise risk management criteria have already been employed. If risks are:  
• evaluated for near and long term impacts, 
• evaluated in context of other risks, 
• mitigated at a detailed enough level to determine impacts across the 
enterprise, 
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• based on a common definition of the enterprise architecture, and 
• account for limitations to mitigations based on the system’s place in the 
development life-cycle. 
Yet the risk still cannot be adequately mitigated, then that may indicate a 
limitation of the enterprise itself, requiring mitigation by changing the enterprise as a 
whole. 
C. ANALYSIS OF RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN PEO 
C4I ETRB 
Utilizing the principles of implementing an enterprise risk management 
framework just described, this section now examines how the PEO C4I ETRB 
implements those principles. 
1. Ability to Consider Short-Term and Long-Term Impacts of Risks 
To implement this principle, both the risk owner and the overarching risk 
management framework would need to mandate a time consideration for risk impacts and 
risk mitigations. While this may also imply a consideration of scope impact, that is 
covered more by the next criterion. The ETRB charter, however, is largely silent on 
definitions of the temporal impacts of Enterprise Technical Risks (ETRs) that are brought 
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The ETRB charter 
is largely silent on 
the content of any 
given enterprise 
technical risk 
(ETR) with regards 
to scope or 
temporal 
considerations. This 
definition is left up 
to the assigned ETR 
owner. 
The ETRB does not 
provide any 
specific guidelines 





on the content of a 
risk description 
would be useful 
with regards to this 
criterion.  
 
As the ETRB charter is silent on this facet of risk management, it would be left to 
the individual ETR owners to determine impact dates for a given risk, which would 
almost certainly lead to inconsistent definitions of impact timelines for risks with 
different owners. Having variations in the mechanisms utilized to define and manage 
risks depending on the risk owner is counter to the core concepts of enterprise risk 
management, indicating that all risks from all aspects of the enterprise should be 
managed in the same fashion and utilizing common criteria. 
While potential impacts of this lack of definition of risk impact timelines within 
the ETRB is further discussed in Chapter IV, it should also be noted that the ETRB 
charter does indicate that ETRB members should “Identify additional impacted areas 
when reviewing a submitted ETR” (PEO C4I 2015, 5). While this appears to be more 
aligned with discussions on how a risk impacts parts of the enterprise other than the 
segment nominating the risk, it could also be used as a method for discussing the timeline 
for risk resolution so as to determine time constraints on mitigating the risk. This should 
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be made clearer in the ETRB’s governing charter to ensure consistency amongst all 
nominated ETRs while enabling more direct comparisons between ETRs. 
2. Evaluating a New Risk with Regard to its Impact on Existing Risks 
This criterion is likely the most fundamental principle of implementing an 
enterprise risk management framework. To manage risks in an enterprise context, all 
risks must be viewed through their impact to the enterprise as a whole, not solely a 
certain subset. To accomplish this, the risk management structure must enable risks to be 
defined in common terminology, reviewed in common forums, and enforce upon the risk 
management membership the requirement to view risks beyond the boundaries of just 
their individual assignments and especially with regard to impacts on existing risks being 
managed by the enterprise. On this criterion, the ETRB charter does specifically address 
the review of risks for impacts beyond those stated in the ETR. The mechanism for this 
evaluation is described in Table 8. 
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risk owners access 




risk definitions and 
levels of detail to 
allow for cross-
referencing of risks. 
ETRB charter states 
that the core 
members shall 
identify any other 
areas that could be 
impacted by a given 
ETR when it is 
defined or updated 
or otherwise 
discussed in the 
ETRB. 
While the charter 
does not specify a 
common method to 
be used to 
determine this 
impact, it does 
indicate that the 
members have the 
responsibility to 
look at individual 
risks in the context 
of other, existing 
risks, or for the 
potential of a new 
risk to generate 
further risks in 
other parts of the 
enterprise. 
 
On this item, the ETRB charter is very specific in assigning the responsibility to 
evaluate the impacts of risks beyond the area they are nominated from. For the ETRB 
Members roles and responsibilities, one of the enumerated tasks is to review each ETR 
and identify other impacted areas beyond those named in the initial ETR. 
The charter is silent on how these other impacts are captured with regard to the 
ETR, nor does it address how these new, presumably enterprise-level, impacts are to be 
tracked over the life of the ETR. It also does not cover how mitigation strategies for the 
enterprise impacts will be developed nor does it describe how responsibility for 
implementing those mitigations will be tracked. The consideration of enterprise impacts 
is important, but also important is how those impacts will be tracked and dealt with. 
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3. Risks Managed at the Most Detailed Level Possible 
Related to the examination of the first criterion, the ETRB Charter is also silent 
on the level of detail necessary to define ETR descriptions or associated mitigation 
strategies. It does indicate that the ETR owner needs to keep the risk current based on all 
inputs. Without specific guidance or a reference to indicate to a risk owner the level of 
detail necessary in the risk definition or mitigation steps, however, it is likely that each 
owner will take their own definition of what constitutes sufficient detail. A summary of 
the ETRB implementation of these best practices is in Table 9. 
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risk statement and 
mitigation tasks to 
determine where 
either risk or 
mitigation impacts 
or interfaces with 
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enterprise. 
The ETRB charter 
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level of detail in 
capturing the risk or 
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mitigations, only 
identifying that the 
risk owner must 
keep the risk 
current. 





impact dates, there 
does not appear to 
be any set guidance 
on the level of 
detail that must be 
captured for each of 
those ETR 
elements. This 
likely results in 
varying levels of 
detail depending on 




There is some degree of compliance with this principle as the ETRB has assigned 
risk ownership responsibility for each ETR, thus there is a person or group responsible 
for defining the risk and associated mitigations. The lack of a reference or other guidance 
to indicate the proper level of detail that could be held consistent for all risks that come to 
the ETRB is a limiting factor with regard to fulfilling this criterion. If all risks receive a 
different level of analysis, and are expressed in differing levels of detail, it will be of little 
consequence that the ETRB members are responsible for identifying all impacted areas 
related to new ETRs, as there will not be enough information in the ETRs for the 
members to make those connections for other impacts. 
Given the current lack of specificity in risk and mitigation definitions, any efforts 
at enterprise risk management centered on this criterion would mostly be the result of 
dedicated individual efforts. This still provides value to the enterprise as a whole but is 
nonetheless inconsistent. Some methods that could improve the implementation of this 
enterprise risk management principle are further discussed in Chapter IV. 
4. Presence of Enterprise Engineering Models or Architectures to 
Provide Objective Context for Technical Risk 
To aid risk reviewers in determining impacts to other systems or organizations 
within the enterprise, a common definition of the enterprise is a critical foundational 
item. To provide detailed risk descriptions, especially impact statements, for risks that 
impact other portions of the enterprise it is necessary to have a common context for 
describing those impacts. Thus an overarching architecture either for the technical 
system-of-systems, or enterprise in any other construct, would provide that common 
context for risk identification or risk management. The enterprise reference artifacts and 
context available to the ETRB are summarized in Table 10. 
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systems or other 
representations of 
the enterprise are in 
work at SPAWAR, 
none are 
specifically 
referenced by the 
ETRB charter for 
comparison.  
If there are no 
common artifacts 
used to define the 
role of a system in 
the scope of the 
whole enterprise, 
then even risks 
described in great 
detail are still 
subject to not 
capturing all the 
enterprise impacts 
of a risk as there is 
no core definition 
of the enterprise. 
 
The ability to fulfill this criterion does not exist entirely within the scope of the 
ETRB. Any common definition of the enterprise, whether architectural or just 
organizational, must be agreed upon by the entirety of the enterprise to be effective. Not 
having an agreed to definition of the enterprise is an enterprise risk in and of itself, and 
something that the ETRB should pursue to benefit the organization’s ability to truly 
perform enterprise risk management.  
As was mentioned in Chapter II, the ETRB charter provides a mechanism to raise 
risks to the PEO’s top level engineering forum, the Systems Engineering Board (SEB), or 
top level program-management board, the Portfolio Governance Board (PGB). A 
potential use case for this process would be nominating the risks associated with 
attempting enterprise risk management without an agreed to set of enterprise system 
architecture artifacts to serve as a common reference for risk identification. 
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5. Risks Evaluated with Context of System Position in Acquisition Life-
Cycle 
The fifth evaluation criterion for organizational alignment to support enterprise 
risk management in Chapter II addressed the concept of ensuring members from all 
aspects of the organization were reviewing risks in areas, whether project or functional, 
outside of their own area of focus. While the ETRB does have all core members review 
all risks, one of the limitations of the board is that it only mandates the core engineering 
staff to be consistent members of the ETRB. While members from other functional areas 
within the PEO are considered as advisors, they are only asked to participate as is 
applicable. Therefore, contributions from the acquisition portions of the organization 
would be inconsistent at best. A summary of the ETRB compliance with this criterion is 
discussed in Table 11. 
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In many ways, the ability of the ETRB to fulfill this risk management principle is 
directly related to the fulfillment of Criterion #5 in Chapter II, specifically with regard to 
the regular participation of acquisition experts in the ETRB. As currently constructed, 
and utilizing only the mandatory members of the ETRB, it would be left to the 
engineering staff to evaluate risks in the context not only of technical impacts, but also 
with consideration for alternate mitigation approaches given potential acquisition impacts 
to the systems in question. This approach would imply very extensive expertise within 
the technical competencies of the organization, and while not necessarily impossible, is 
nonetheless very unlikely. Therefore, it would be prudent for the ETRB to expand its 
mandated membership, or otherwise incorporate other functional areas in the review of 
potential enterprise risks to ensure all aspects of a risk are considered when mitigation 
strategies are being decided on. 
6. Assessment of Ability to Mitigate Risk in Current Enterprise 
Architecture 
Much like the previous enterprise risk management evaluation criterion was 
linked to an organizational alignment criterion from Chapter II, this criterion is linked to 
criterion #4 earlier in this chapter. There is always the potential that a new risk is best 
mitigated not through any existing aspect of the enterprise, but rather by expanding the 
enterprise through a new system or other method of expanding available capabilities. The 
summary of the ETRB’s fulfillment of this criterion is provided in Table 12. 
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criteria identified in 
this chapter. 
Therefore, it is not 
a major limitation 
of the ETRB that it 
does not address 
this concept, but is 
still something that 
should be 
considered in any 
revisions to the 
ETRB scope or 
charter. 
 
In order for the team performing an evaluation of a risk to determine if it is best 
mitigated through existing components of the enterprise, or if it instead defines a new 
function of the enterprise, the team must have an agreed to representation of the 
enterprise to use as a baseline. This was discussed in regards to enterprise risk 
management principle #4 earlier in this chapter and included the analysis that PEO C4I 
did not have a common definition or representation of the enterprise available as a 
resource for the ETRB.  
Therefore, it will not be possible for the ETRB to consider methods to fulfill this 
criterion without first implementing or developing an enterprise baseline definition to 
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meet criterion #4. As an approach is defined to be able to provide a common 
representation of the enterprise, however, there should also be consideration on how to 
expand the ETRB scope to utilize that enterprise baseline not only for mitigation of risks 
within the enterprise, but for evaluating when the best mitigation option involves 
expansion of the enterprise. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief review of risk management principles, both within 
industry in general and within the DOD in particular. It discussed some of the basic 
aspects of DOD risk management guidance and contrasted that with some of the 
fundamental concepts of enterprise risk management. This included the idea of elevating 
risk management to a strategic level through the regular involvement of senior leadership 
in risk management discussions. 
The chapter then utilized core concepts from existing enterprise risk management 
research to define six core principles for successfully implementing enterprise risk 
management techniques within an organization. These principles began with very 
fundamental concepts, such as regarding risks beyond their impacts in the immediate 
term. The principles also include those that would be implemented via a mature 
organizational approach to enterprise risk management, such as having a common 
definition of the enterprise, whether architectural or in some other form. This common 
definition is necessary for any risks to truly be evaluated in an enterprise context, 
otherwise every risk owner’s view of the enterprise would almost certainly be different. 
The final enterprise risk management principle was to examine risk mitigations not only 
for mitigation options within the existing enterprise, but also to examine risk mitigations 
that involved expanding the enterprise itself. This aligns closely with the concepts 
utilized by DOD in threat and gap assessments when defining the capabilities to be 
fulfilled by new acquisition efforts. 
These six enterprise risk management principles were then applied to the PEO 
C4I ETRB. An initial analysis of the ETRB’s level of compliance was performed, 
including discussion of what was potentially implied by language in the ETRB charter 
59 
even if it was not mentioned specifically. This high-level evaluation also considered areas 
where other aspects of the organization needed to provide reference or baseline material, 
such as an overall enterprise architecture, to the ETRB to enable full enterprise risk 
management.  
More comprehensive analysis of the ETRB’s level of implementation of these six 
principles are provided in Chapter IV. This analysis includes a discussion on the 
limitations of the PEO C4I ETRB based on any gaps found in the board’s implementation 
of these core enterprise risk management principles, as well as any other enabling 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEO C4I ETRB 
Using the evaluation criteria established in Chapters II and III based on core 
principles for organizational alignment and enterprise risk management, this chapter 
provides a more in depth review of how the PEO C4I ETRB implementation strategy 
fulfills those criteria. This review covers the level of alignment between the ETRB and 
the core principles, but also the impacts of that alignment or misalignment.  
This chapter also reviews potential adjustments that could be made either to the 
ETRB’s structure or its implementation to improve its alignment with the core principles 
described in the prior chapters. This review includes a discussion of the benefits to be 
seen both at the level of the ETRB and for the organization as a whole if the suggested 
adjustments are made. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The comparison of the PEO C4I ETRB structure and participants found several 
areas that reflected excellent alignment with the organizational principles discussed in 
Chapter II for how best to enable enterprise consideration of risks. There were also 
several areas that demonstrated poor alignment and one that was largely undefined. This 
last category is described as neutral in the following discussion. It should be noted that 
the assessment of one criterion resulted in a strength for the ETRB in one context and a 
weakness for the ETRB in another context. While the categories are labeled as strengths 
and weaknesses, this is solely in regards to the level of alignment with the core 
organizational principles defined for maximum enabling of enterprise risk management. 
The actual impacts of these strengths and weaknesses are discussed in the 
Recommendations section. 
1. Strengths 
Within the organizational alignment criteria, there were two areas where the PEO 
C4I ETRB strongly aligned with the core organizational principles. These are: 1) 
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Enterprise-Level Definition of Risk Management Practices and 2) Evaluating Risk in 
Terms of Impact to Efforts Other Than Your Own. 
a. Enterprise-Level Definition of Risk Management Practices 
While there may not be an enterprise standard for how to define or mitigate each 
new ETR brought before the ETRB, the fact that there is an ETRB  indicates that 
leadership acknowledges that there are risks that have enterprise level impacts. It is also a 
reflection of the desire of leadership to manage and mitigate those risks as an enterprise 
organization. 
This does not necessarily speak to the efficacy of this enterprise board, and that is 
addressed later in this section. Acknowledging the presence of risks at an enterprise level 
and establishing a working-level framework with representatives from across the 
enterprise are necessary actions to implement effective enterprise risk management. The 
chartering of the ETRB demonstrates that PEO C4I has an understanding that risks can 
have impacts beyond a single project, and an appreciation that those types of risks must 
be managed in an enterprise context. 
The existence of the ETRB within the context of the PEO organization also 
provides a mechanism for the ETRB to get leadership attention on key or highly 
impactful risks. This defined path to take an enterprise risk and utilize the PEO’s top 
systems engineering board (SEB) or programmatic board (PGB) to assist in mitigating 
the risk demonstrates a commitment to enterprise risk management at the highest levels 
of the organization. That is why the ETRB is considered to demonstrate a strength in the 
ability to coordinate enterprise level definition of risk management practices. 
b. Evaluating Risk In Terms of Impact to Efforts Other Than Your Own 
The ETRB charter dictates that one of the core responsibilities of the members of 
the ETRB is to evaluate all newly raised candidate enterprise technical risks for potential 
impacts beyond those stated in the draft risk. This is the definition of enterprise thinking 
and a key enabler to enterprise risk management. The breadth of the enterprise 
considerations is dependent on which areas of an organization are considered members of 
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the board, which is discussed later, but the mandate that all members consider any 
potential impact of the risk immediately brings the risk to an enterprise level of review 
and potential mitigation. 
For those employees that are members of the ETRB, this also emphasizes the 
organizational concept that each employee must consider risk ownership as part of their 
core responsibilities; also, that risk management must not just be for areas of the 
enterprise that they work in every day but rather in all aspects of the enterprise. Through 
feeling that responsibility, and then participating in a forum such as the ETRB that 
mandates they consider all potential impacts of a risk and not just impacts within their 
project or their focus area, the organizational foundation for defining risks in terms of the 
enterprise and managing risks in terms of the enterprise is established. 
2. Weaknesses 
The analysis also showed that for three of the organizational alignment criteria, 
the ETRB had weak alignment. These are: 1) Employee’s Responsibility / Accountability 
for Managing Risk, 2) Cross-Team Coordination for Purpose of Managing Risk, and 3) 
Enterprise-Level Definition of Risk Areas for Each Organizational Component 
a. Employee’s Responsibility / Accountability for Managing Risk 
This organizational criterion provided an interesting contrast to one of the areas 
that was evaluated as a strength for the ETRB, the requirement of members of the ETRB 
to evaluate risks for impacts to areas other than their own. While that edict in the ETRB 
charter is indeed a strength with regard to close alignment to that enterprise-view of risks 
within an organization, it is also in many ways a strength with a weak foundation. 
The ETRB charter does dictate that all ETRB members consider risks in an 
enterprise context by considering impacts outside of their own area of responsibility. The 
ETRB directed membership, however, consists only of participants from the engineering 
competency within PEO C4I. Therefore, to a large extent the strength of an enterprise 
viewpoint on risks at the ETRB is restricted by the fact that such a limited scope of 
expertise within PEO C4I is required to participate in the ETRB. 
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If only the employees with engineering backgrounds or areas of focus are 
mandated to consider risk in an enterprise context, or to have the responsibility to manage 
risks at an enterprise risk board, then the ability for the organization as a whole to assert 
that all employees feel the responsibility to manage risk at an enterprise level seems 
severely limited. Therefore, this assessment has concluded the ETRB has very weak 
alignment to this particular criterion. Furthermore, this weak alignment also impacts the 
next organizational criterion under consideration. 
b. Cross-Team Coordination for Purpose of Managing Risk 
It is very difficult for this to be seen as anything other than a weakness for the 
ETRB. As the only mandatory members are the engineering staff, there is only one team 
with the responsibility to participate in managing enterprise risks. Cross-team 
coordination is not possible as there are no other teams participating in an enterprise 
sense. 
There is a caveat to this assessment. The ETRB is by its very name focused on 
Enterprise Technical Risks, so the core membership is focused on the engineering staff 
which is a logical path for the board to take. For PEO C4I as a whole, however, this is the 
only group specifically charged with enterprise risk management; so even if the ETRB is 
viewed to be effectively managing technical risk at an enterprise level, the PEO as a 
whole would still face the same limitation with regard to cross-team coordination.  
Therefore, while it is possible to view the ability of the engineering staff to 
coordinate on risks across multiple projects as a strength of the ETRB, the overall ability 
to have cross-team risk management is significantly limited. If the PEO viewed the 
technical domain as the primary source of enterprise risk then this might be the right 
approach toward enterprise risk management. The path for leadership to identify key 
areas of potential enterprise risk, however, is also considered a weakness in this analysis. 
c. Enterprise-Level Definition of Risk Areas for Each Organizational 
Component 
One of the strengths of the ETRB is that it has two paths to elevate critical 
enterprise risks to the higher echelons of the PEO organization. In fact, it has defined 
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paths for elevating risks to the top engineering body in the PEO, the Systems Engineering 
Board (SEB) as well as the top programmatic body, the Portfolio Governance Board 
(PGB). That these two paths are both defined indicates the idea that the ETRB could have 
risks with both technical and programmatic impacts and thus could require assistance, 
prioritization, or adjudication in both the technical and programmatic domains. 
The reverse is not documented as part of the ETRB though. There is no directed 
or specified path by which the PEO leadership, whether technical or programmatic, could 
provide inputs on areas of enterprise risk that leadership desires an increased focus or 
awareness. While in theory any member of the PEO organization could nominate a new 
risk for consideration from the ETRB, and therefore leadership could identify those risks, 
there is no specifically defined mechanism to solicit this leadership insight. 
If the path to elevate working-level risks for leadership consideration is defined, 
any path to provide leadership guidance down to the ETRB should be equally defined. 
This may be accomplished by simply amending the ETRB charter to reflect the reality if 
this guidance is already being provided today. Given the evidence available via this 
research effort though, this is evaluated as a weakness of the ETRB with regard to 
alignment to organizational evaluation criteria. 
3. Neutral 
One of the organizational alignment criterion was implied or otherwise indirectly 
indicated in this research, but not explicitly defined within the ETRB, which is 
Allowance for Multiple Teams to Co-Own Risk Mitigation. This criterion is therefore 
evaluated as neither a strength nor a weakness, but rather as neutral. 
Similar to the concept of cross-team coordination for risk management, the ETRB 
does not specify any particular allowances for multiple teams to own a risk. While the 
ETRB membership can identify other impacts beyond the team that submits the risk, the 
ETR owner is described as a single person or team. 
Again, this is not explicit in the charter which is why the alignment is considered 
neutral; as multiple team ownership of an enterprise risk is neither defined as a potential 
66 
mitigation mechanism, nor prohibited by any of the other tenets of the ETRB. To better 
manage enterprise risk, a revision of the charter could more clearly define processes to 
allow for multiple groups to manage and own a risk. 
While allowing for a multiple-team risk ownership construct would assist in 
implementing this organizational alignment principle, some of the other weaknesses 
identified earlier in this chapter would also need to be addressed to make multiple-team 
ownership more productive. Recommendations to improve the alignment of the ETRB to 
the organizational principles that enable enterprise risk management as described in 
Chapter II is covered in the next section. 
4. Recommendations 
The recommendations provided in this section are from the perspective of 
ensuring the PEO C4I ETRB has the greatest possible alignment with the organizational 
principles that are most important for enabling full enterprise risk management.  
a. Assign Risk Management Responsibilities to Every Employee 
For any other recommendation to be implementable, there must first be a clear 
definition of responsibility for all members of the organization to manage risk. A 
foundational way of accomplishing this could include adding performance objectives for 
each employee related to managing risk. Some employees already have such an entry, in 
whole or in part, in their yearly performance plan. Therefore, expanding this practice 
would provide not only a mechanism but also motivation for employees to analyze 
organizational activities for risks and take a role in managing and mitigating those risks. 
Additionally, it would be beneficial for PEO leadership to present cases of successful risk 
management at regular intervals, perhaps at all hands meetings or via the regular internal 
PEO newsletter. This would not only demonstrate the benefits of an organizational focus 
on risk management, but would also reinforce to all employees that they too should be 
focused on risk management as it is a leadership priority. 
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b. Expanding Membership of the ETRB 
It is possible that the ETRB was solely intended to manage technical risks. Given 
that there are no other enterprise risk boards in PEO C4I, however, this recommendation 
examines methods to increase the scope and expertise of the ETRB to be truly 
representative of the enterprise. In order to become a truly enterprise risk board, even if it 
maintains its focus on technical risks, expertise from other functional areas should be 
included as mandated members of the board. While the risks discussed could still be 
technical in nature, the mitigations for the risks do not necessarily need to be in purely 
the technical domain.  
Even if the board members follow the organizational principles from Chapter II, 
through taking personal ownership of all risks across the enterprise, coordinating with 
representatives from other teams or projects to address risks, and even sharing risk 
ownership responsibility with other members, if all of those members are still engineers 
the potential risk mitigations that will be considered will be technical in nature by default. 
For true enterprise risk management, other avenues for risk mitigation must be 
considered, and to understand potential mitigation options in non-technical domains, the 
board would greatly benefit from having mandatory members outside of the engineering 
functional area. 
The rest of the board policies could remain intact and could provide even greater 
benefit through the more varied expertise of the audience. For example, the policy that all 
ETRB members should examine every candidate risk for impacts beyond those stated by 
the member identifying the risk would result in a more comprehensive view of the 
potential impacts, extending beyond the technical domain. This is an artificial limitation 
of the board as it stands now given the narrow scope of mandatory members, even if the 
desire is to focus exclusively on technical risks. 
c. Requesting Regular Enterprise Risk Focus Area Inputs from Leadership 
While the ETRB does have a path to utilize at the chair’s discretion to raise risks 
to higher echelon boards for assistance or prioritization, there is no identified mechanism 
for those higher boards to identify areas of enterprise risk of particular concern that the 
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ETRB should place increased focus. As stated earlier, it is possible given the existing 
ETRB charter that any member of leadership could raise their own risk to the ETRB. It 
would seem that the concept of enterprise risk management would be better encouraged if 
a regular interaction with PEO leadership was scheduled specifically to gather insight on 
areas of risk they see and about those on which they are expanding effort. 
Beyond the knowledge of where leadership sees potential areas of enterprise risk 
would be the added benefit of learning if any additional efforts had been initiated by the 
PEO leadership to address those risks. Whether pilot projects, or other experiments, it 
would benefit the ETRB to have that awareness so that the results of any of those 
initiatives could be considered as potential mitigations or guidance for future risks raised 
within the board. In short, the more interaction there is between the risk board and 
leadership the more effective the enterprise risk management efforts can be. These 
interactions should not be solely event driven, but schedule driven as well. As an added 
benefit, having these regular information exchanges on potential areas of risk will also 
provide the opportunity to gain feedback from leadership on proposed mitigation efforts 
to existing risks. This improves the ability to have cross-team coordination on enterprise 
risks, though in this case one of the teams is the overall PEO leadership group. 
d. Requiring Regular ETR Status Updates to Leadership 
This recommendation is in regards to an item that was considered a strength from 
the organizational alignment perspective. The ETRB does define a path to get enterprise-
level assistance from both the top PEO engineering board and the top programmatic 
board. Utilization of either of those paths, however, is left to the discretion of the risk 
board leadership. This indicates that there are no regular updates to PEO leadership from 
a risk perspective but rather only in extraordinary circumstances. 
Relating to the previous recommendation, if there was a regular meeting to gather 
feedback from leadership on areas of potential enterprise risk that on those they desired 
the risk board to focus, it would also provide an opportunity for the risk board to discuss 
current risks that were being tracked and mitigated. This not only would provide a means 
to raise leadership awareness on these areas of risk, but would also allow for any 
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necessary reprioritization from leadership to adjust the board’s focus if it was not 
currently on areas that leadership felt warranted the most attention. 
If an additional meeting were too challenging logistically, another path would be 
to ensure enterprise risks were a regular input to the PEO existing risk review processes. 
Current processes allow for each PMW to enter their most critical risks, in the view of the 
Program Manager, for a monthly review with the PEO and associated staff. Adding the 
enterprise risks as an input to this existing process would not only get leadership review 
of those enterprise risks, but would put them in a context to be evaluated against existing 
PMW risks that were already in the monthly review.  An enterprise technical risk 
discussion could also be made a recurring agenda item for the PGB, ensuring a regular 
discussion of enterprise risks with leadership without needing to add a new meeting to 
already busy calendars. 
Given that one of the key benefits of enterprise risk management is that it raises 
the level of risk consideration beyond the project execution level up to the enterprise 
strategy level, a regular briefing to leadership on current priority risks would provide the 
pathway for the board to get that strategic risk perspective. This would help keep 
leadership more informed on current efforts but also ensure the board was utilizing its 
resources in areas that the PEO leadership most needed assistance mitigating existing or 
future risks. 
e. Defining Mechanisms and Criteria for Establishing Multi-team Risk 
Ownership 
There is nothing in the ETRB charter that prohibits establishing multiple owners 
from multiple teams to own a given enterprise risk, but the ability to do so is limited in 
two ways. The first is that the membership of the ETRB is currently limited to technical 
staff and so while multiple different project engineering teams could share a risk, it 
would still be limited by the technical focus of those members. The second is that since 
the current technical membership are the only personnel required to evaluate potential 
impacts to other efforts within the enterprise, some key, non-technical, impacts may be 
missed so not all potentially impacted teams would be identified to share ownership. 
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Both of these items could be largely ameliorated through the implementation of 
the first recommendation in this section. Increasing the breadth of the mandatory board 
members would increase the potential cross-team impacts both to non-technical areas 
within existing risks, and help identify additional non-technical teams that would benefit 
from sharing ownership of a risk. 
B. ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A review of the PEO C4I ETRB alignment to the enterprise risk management 
principles identified in Chapter III had decidedly mixed results. There was only one 
criterion each identified either as a strength or as a weakness. The remaining four criteria 
were assessed as neutral. These neutral assessments are discussed in detail in the 
following sections, but generally fall into two categories. The first category is that criteria 
are simply not addressed by the PEO C4I ETRB charter, and thus the level of their 
implementation is unclear. The second category is that the criteria’s implementation are 
limited based on the ETRB structure and may be addressed in part by other 
recommendations either in the organizational alignment section or in this enterprise risk 
management section. 
1. Strengths 
In reviewing the ETRB against the core principles of enterprise risk management, 
there was one area where the ETRB demonstrated a strong alignment. That was, 
Evaluating a New Risk with Regard to its Impacts on Existing Risks. 
One of the core areas of emphasis for the ETRB members is that they are required 
to consider any and all impacts of a new ETR. This includes consideration for projects in 
their area of responsibility and any other area they have familiarity with. As this is 
required with all nominated risks, by definition any risk raised at the ETRB will be 
considered in the context of all previous ETRs, as well as any localized risks that the 
ETRB members may also be familiar with. 
Even with this being asserted as a strength, there are some limitations, including 
the fact that the membership of the ETRB required to do an assessment of the 
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relationship between new and existing risks is limited to the engineering staff. This was 
cited as a weakness in the previous section. The assessment with regard to implementing 
best practices of enterprise risk management was focused on having the process and 
focus on the best practice. On that front, the ETRB is very well aligned to implementing 
that best practice. 
2. Weaknesses 
One of the criterion associated with implementing enterprise risk management 
best practices was analyzed to have very little alignment with the current implementation 
of the PEO C4I ETRB. That criterion was Presence of Enterprise Engineering Models or 
Architectures to Provide Objective Context for Technical Risks. To enable employees to 
assess the impacts of risk at an enterprise level, it is crucial that they all share a common 
definition of the enterprise. One method to achieve this common understanding is to have 
one or a set of enterprise engineering models or architectures that can serve as a common 
reference. These enterprise models would identify the key functions of each enterprise 
components and how they relate to each other via interfaces and dependencies. 
 The presence of such a model, combined with the edict that all members of the 
risk board assess risks across the whole enterprise, not just their area of expertise, would 
be the desired foundation for developing enterprise-level risks that all members of the 
risk board would understand. Without these models, it is likely that there are multiple 
views among multiple members of what the enterprise is, how the various components 
relate to each other, and what dependencies exist that would either exacerbate or mitigate 
candidate risks. 
 Therefore, while not necessarily a task for the risk board itself to implement, the 
development of these enterprise architecture models are something the members of the 
risk board should contribute to. By assisting in the development of the enterprise 
architecture models, the risk board members will have a deeper understanding of the 
relationships between entities across the enterprise and will have a better foundation for 
evaluating new enterprise risks in the future. 
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 Developing enterprise architectures will not help only in the enterprise risk 
management domain, but will also help in defining functionality and boundaries for 
systems within the enterprise, identifying interfaces amongst those systems, and 
determining if there are repetitive functions or inefficient connections within the 
enterprise as a whole. As each of these limitations are discovered, they can then be fed 
into the enterprise risk management process for adjudication and mitigation. 
3. Neutral 
The majority of the criteria used to evaluate the ETRB’s implementation of 
enterprise risk management principles demonstrated a neutral alignment, neither strongly 
nor weakly aligned. Of those four criteria in the neutral assessment grouping, the first two 
listed in this section are limited by lack of explicit description of their implementation 
within the ETRB, the second two are limited by other foundational ETRB construct or 
business rule limitations. These four criteria are: 1) Ability to Consider Short-Term and 
Long-Term Impacts to Risk, 2) Risks Managed at the Most Detailed Level Possible, 3) 
Risks Evaluated with Context of System Position in Acquisition Life-Cycle, and 4) 
Assessment of Ability to Mitigate Risk in Current Enterprise Architecture. 
a. Ability to Consider Short-Term and Long-Term Impacts to Risk 
There is not anything in the ETRB charter that defines the level of detail that 
should be associated with a risk. This is relevant to all aspects of risk definition, 
management and mitigation, including the timeline for taking corrective action on the 
risk, or the durations at which impacts will start to be seen if the risk is not addressed. 
The definition of short and long term impacts from a risk are left up to the risk owner to 
define, and the risk board to modify as they feel is appropriate. 
 Without any definition or reference for how detailed the risk impact statements 
should be, or within what durations impacts should be considered, however, it is likely 
that there will be a wide range of risk impact timelines depending on the risk owner’s 
perspective. This criterion was evaluated as neutral because the lack of definition of 
impact timeline parameters is not limited by the ETRB charter, it is merely not addressed. 
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 Providing a reference risk as an example, or establishing a template that forces a 
risk owner to consider various durations into the future and the related risk impacts would 
help mitigate this. It would also provide for greater commonality in risk definitions and 
would make them easier to compare in the future as mitigations are enacted. 
b. Risks Managed at the Most Detailed Level Possible 
Similar to the previous criterion, there is no definition provided by the ETRB 
charter for what level of detail is necessary within a risk definition. Just as the previous 
item discussed short and long-term impacts if the risk is not adequately mitigated, there 
are no given criteria for definition of the risk statement, identification of impacted 
systems, or level of detail in the mitigation steps. 
 This again is assessed as a neutral level of implementation as the corrective action 
would be for the ETRB documentation to provide a reference or other definition of how 
much detail should be provided for any risk brought before the board. This should 
include a common level of detail for the risk statement, including how specific the impact 
should be, whether the impact date should be included in the risk statement or as a 
separate parameter, and other such details. It should also define how the impacts to other 
components in the enterprise are defined. It could be just at the product level, or at the 
most detailed component level possible, which would relate back to the enterprise 
architecture model weakness described earlier in the chapter. It would also address the 
level of detail needed in mitigation steps, including identifying the person or group 
responsible for performing the mitigation step, the time the mitigation should be 
completed by, and any dependencies among mitigation steps that dictate which could be 
executed in serial or in parallel. 
 Just as with the previous criterion, providing a reference or template to ensure all 
risks have equal levels of detail throughout all the components of the risk will make risks 
easier to compare. Otherwise, there remains the possibility that risks that are related will 
not be reviewed because there is not enough information in the risk components to 
identify such a dependency. Having a common set of information associated with each 
risk makes every other aspect of enterprise risk management easier to execute. 
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c. Risks Evaluated with Context of System Position in Acquisition Life-
Cycle 
The ability for the members of the ETRB to consider the impacts of a systems’ 
position in the acquisition life-cycle, or any other acquisition impacts associated with a 
risk is partially linked to the personnel included in the ETRB and also partially linked to 
the emphasis on enterprise risk areas that could be provided by leadership, both 
weaknesses identified earlier in this chapter. The considerations for the acquisition life-
cycle as it relates to enterprise risks could take several forms. One could be that if a risk 
is discovered late in a systems’ life-cycle, it may be that the optimum mitigation is not to 
change the existing system, but to mitigate the risk with a follow-on system or elsewhere 
in the enterprise. Another consideration is that the mitigation for a risk might be 
something that could be addressed via acquisition means, as opposed to technical means. 
Having acquisition expertise, as well as logistics, contracts, and other core 
program functional areas present at the ETRB would aid in assessing each of these areas, 
not just when technical solutions are not considered ideal, but also in terms of evaluating 
each new risk that comes before the ETRB. As it is structured now, the emphasis in 
regard to risk mitigation efforts will tend toward technical mitigations, when other 
approaches may be easier to implement and yield better results. By addressing the 
weakness regarding breadth of participating personnel earlier in this chapter, many more 
options for addressing this neutral implementation of an enterprise risk management 
practice will become available. 
d. Assessment of Ability to Mitigate Risk in Current Enterprise 
Architecture 
As mentioned in the previous evaluation, one option for mitigating a risk to a 
system is not to change the existing system. Instead the most reasonable mitigation 
strategy could be to develop a new system, or an additional component to extend an 
existing system. In Chapter III this criterion was described in the context of the overall 
DOD acquisition approach where existing capability limitations, and the risks they placed 
on mission execution, were used to identify potential requirements for new systems. 
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This approach should be something the ETRB also considers. When a new risk is 
proposed, it should be evaluated and mitigations considered not only for within the 
existing enterprise and system boundaries, but also for the potential in developing a new 
system or component to mitigate the risk. There are considerations at all levels of system 
development to best implement this principle, which leverages the earlier discussions on 
ensuring representation from all dimensions of system development, not just engineering 
but also acquisition, contracting, logistics and any others. 
This was not evaluated as a weakness of the ETRB as it could only truly be 
implemented if all the other organizational and enterprise risk management principles had 
already been implemented or assessed as strengths. Once the other recommendations of 
this chapter are implemented, the inclusion of this consideration is the next extension that 
should be applied to the ETRB. 
4. Recommendations 
The following are recommendations for implementation by the ETRB to improve 
its alignment with enterprise risk management best practices. As was stated in the 
organizational alignment recommendations, if any of these limitations is by intent, then 
PEO C4I should use that knowledge to tailor the implementation of these 
recommendations. 
a. Define a Common Risk Definition Template  
Two of the criteria that were evaluated as neutral are directly related to there 
being no pre-defined level of definition required for enterprise risks. This includes 
consideration of impacts at various points in the future but also more fundamentally in 
the definition of the risk itself. 
 The development both of a risk template, and a set common evaluation criteria 
would ensure that all risks had the same level of definition, easing the ability of the board 
to compare them to past enterprise risks, and better understand the impacts and mitigation 
strategies. Without these templates and reference implementations, risks will continue to 
be defined at varying levels of detail depending on the risk owner, and as a result will 
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likely have potential mitigations or enterprise impacts missed just through lack of 
understanding of the scope of the risk. 
b. Develop Common, Enterprise Engineering Models and Architecture 
Products 
While this recommendation is not solely for the risk board to implement, as stated 
earlier this should be an activity that the risk board members should participate in 
directly. To take it further, this should be undertaken after the broadening of the risk 
board membership is implemented, as definition of enterprise models and architectures 
should be done not only with technical considerations, but with input from all aspects of 
system development. 
 To further integrate this with prior recommendations, the development of 
enterprise models should focus on first defining the enterprise in areas that leadership 
considers the most in need of the attention of the risk board. The enterprise artifacts could 
then be expanded in stages from this core set of focus areas until the entire enterprise 
architecture is defined.  
This should be done not only for the enterprise as it is currently implemented, but 
also to provide an enterprise architecture for stages in the future, as decided by 
leadership, to aid in risk mitigation efforts. This future vision will help the risk board 
determine if a risk should be mitigated in the current enterprise architecture, or as a future 
extension of it. 
c. Provide Mechanisms to Consider Risk Mitigations within Existing 
Enterprise or as Expansion of the Enterprise 
As with earlier recommendations that were dependent on mutual implementation, 
this is likely the last recommendation that should be pursued. One of the items the risk 
board should consider when evaluating a risk is whether it is best addressed in the current 
enterprise scope, or if it should be addressed by new effort that changes or expands the 
enterprise. Again, this is best accomplished once the risk board membership is expanded 
beyond just the technical domain. 
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Also, this can only truly be considered once an overall enterprise architecture is 
defined and agreed upon, as that will provide the context for what functions are currently 
inside and outside the enterprise. Additionally, any efforts that would require new 
systems or acquisition efforts would benefit from there being a regular interaction with 
leadership to discuss those potential mitigations, as was recommended earlier in this 
chapter.  
Finally, any recommendations to potentially add new systems or components to 
the enterprise should be considered in the context of the future enterprise architecture 
depictions. In the most synergistic of implementations, the evaluation of an enterprise 
risk that leads to an expansion of the enterprise, would also be evaluated by the group 
owning the enterprise architecture to result in a modification of their future state model. 
C. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS 
Many of the evaluation criteria used for both the organizational alignment and 
enterprise risk management assessments were gathered from research in areas other than 
DOD. These guidelines were still effective in assessing the PEO C4I ETRB, but some 
standard aspects of military organizations, such as personnel rotations or documented 
concepts of operations were not considered. Those limitations are discussed further here.  
 
a. Impacts of Rotational Nature of Military Organizations 
The nature of military, or military/civilian hybrid, organizations is that personnel 
often change with regularity. Almost all military positions are inherently rotational and 
the same can be said for many civilian positions in military organizations. Therefore, any 
efforts to expand the membership of the ETRB, or implement enterprise architectures 
will be limited by any knowledge lost when key organizational members rotate out of the 
organization. 
This can be mitigated somewhat by implementing things such as common 
definitions and common procedures, but even so there is a natural learning curve when 
new personnel come into an organization. While viewed as a limitation, it is equally 
possible that new personnel bring new ideas and approaches to enterprise risk 
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management that improve the risk board as a whole. It would be prudent to develop some 
level of intellectual knowledge consistency amongst members of the board to ensure 
continuity of approach even in the midst of personnel rotations. 
b. Rationale for Organizing the ETRB around Technical Risks 
The analysis in Chapters II through IV assumed that because the ETRB was the 
only enterprise risk board within PEO C4I, it would be advantageous to expand its focus 
to consider all enterprise risks. This was viewed as providing additional value to the PEO 
as not all risks are inherently technical. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the PEO derives benefits from limiting the 
enterprise risk board to include only technical risks evaluated only by engineering 
personnel. This seems unlikely, but should be a consideration when reviewing the 
analysis and recommendations throughout this thesis. 
c. Lack of PEO C4I ETRB Standard Operating Procedures 
Several of the recommendations include further defining a risk template to ensure 
a common level of detail is associated with all risk statements, impact statements, impact 
timelines and mitigation efforts. These are the sort of items that might be identified in a 
standard operating procedure (SOP) document. The ETRB Charter does reference an 
SOP, but through research with PEO C4I, this SOP was not able to be found and 
therefore was not referenced in this thesis. If the SOP does still exist and defines some of 
these criteria, those recommendations should be reviewed and revised accordingly. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter served as the primary analysis chapter of this thesis. It focused on 
two main sections, the first being a review of the assessments of the ETRB’s alignment to 
key organizational principles to implement enterprise risk management, and the second 
regarding a review of the ETRB’s level of adherence to core enterprise risk management 
principles. 
There was a review of each of the five organizational alignment criteria, and an 
assessment as to whether the ETRB alignment to those criteria was strong, weak, or 
79 
neutral. This section also included a set of recommendations with an emphasis on how to 
improve alignment between the ETRB and the three weak and one neutral criterion. 
There was then a review of the six enterprise risk management best practices and 
an assessment to the level of implementation each of these best practices saw within the 
ETRB. The level of implementation was assessed again as strong, weak or neutral. The 
section closed with a set of recommendations on how to best address the one weak and 
four neutral implementations. 
Several of the recommendations between the two categories were inter-related, 
dependencies between improving the organizational alignment and implementing 
enterprise risk management best practices. This was not surprising as any best practice 
has to be implemented within the context of the organization it operates within. 
Finally, there was a brief discussion on the limitations of implementing the 
provided recommendations. This includes the consideration of the rotational nature of 
personnel within military-aligned organizations as well as the potential that the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This thesis provided a foundational review of key organizational alignment and 
enterprise risk management principles that were then utilized to provide an analysis on 
the efficacy of the PEO C4I ETRB. The ETRB was analyzed against both sets of 
principles. Strengths and weaknesses were identified with regard to the board’s overall 
alignment to those principles. As a result of that analysis, several recommendations were 
made in regards to both organizational alignment and risk management best practices.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter IV included an in-depth review of areas where the PEO C4I ETRB 
strongly or weakly aligned with the organizational and risk management evaluation 
criteria. As a result of the analysis that identified those strengths and weaknesses, several 
recommendations specific to PEO C4I improving organizational alignment or more 
specifically implementing enterprise risk management best practices were made. Those 
recommendations are summarized in Table 13. 
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Table 13.   Summary of Organizational and Risk Management Alignment 
Recommendations 
Review Area Recommendation 
Organizational Alignment 1. Assign risk management 
responsibilities to every 
employee 
2. Expand membership of the 
ETRB 
3. Request regular enterprise risk 
focus area inputs from 
leadership 
4. Require regular ETR status 
updates to leadership 
5. Define mechanisms and 
criteria for establishing multi-
team risk ownership 
Enterprise Risk Management 1. Define a common risk 
definition template 
2. Develop common, enterprise 
engineering models and 
architecture products 
3. Provide mechanisms to 
consider risk mitigations 
within existing enterprise or as 




The organization will have the discretion to implement these in a manner that best 
supports existing processes and personnel. PEO C4I will also have to make a decision on 
whether to implement all recommendations at once, or in full. Regardless of future 
implementation, the analysis methodology proved very effective and also allows for the 
potential to expand or restrict the criteria used as more research in the organizational 
alignment and enterprise risk management areas continues.  
Criteria could be added, changed, or replaced over time, and increasingly tailored 
to a given organization’s mission set. The evaluation process is consistent and repeatable, 
allowing for independent reviewers to provide bounded and implementable 
recommendations. Developing the analysis framework and the process for utilizing the 
framework was the goal of this thesis, and the use of the PEO C4I ETRB use case 
demonstrated the effectiveness of both the framework and evaluation process as well as 
the ability to leverage the framework to provide specific recommendations to improve 
overall enterprise risk management within the target organization. 
B. POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research provides a foundation for organizational analysis, but there are 
many other areas that were not addressed, or could be studied in more depth. This 
includes not only additional research into the foundational criteria used to establish this 
evaluation framework, but also a study of examples where some of the recommendations 
from this thesis were implemented by organizations and how effective the 
recommendations proved to be in practice. 
Given that one of the core precursors to enterprise risk management was having 
an enterprise definition or system-of-systems definition of potential risk areas, a potential 
future area of research could be effective methods of defining enterprise or systems-of-
systems design and architecture products as well as a methodology for utilizing these 
system-of-systems architectures as a tool for identifying potential enterprise risks.  
A study of the methods that organizations use to instill personal responsibility for 
various organizational functions would also be beneficial. In this area of study, it would 
reflect potential methods to enforce each employee having ownership of risk 
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management. This would include initial motivation, measuring progress, and evaluation 
of employee efficacy at performing risk management and mitigation tasks.  
A foundational item for implementation of enterprise risk management was to 
define a common way of identifying, managing and mitigating risks. To enable this, there 
is a need to provide an enterprise risk management plan that describes how to conduct 
those activities so that all portions of an organization implement them in a common way. 
One mechanism to help with this common implementation is to provide an enterprise risk 
management tool or database where all risks can be stored and viewed by all 
stakeholders. Additional research on the key features of enterprise risk management 
tools, to provide the functionality to perform full enterprise risk management, would be 
valuable information for organizations looking to adjust their risk management approach. 
Many of the organizational alignment concepts and associated evaluation criteria 
were based upon the unwritten premise that there was consistency in the workforce, such 
that continuous retraining was not necessary. This is often not the case in a military 
organization and was accordingly listed as a limitation of the evaluation framework. As a 
result of those military rotations, often civilian employees are placed in temporary 
positions while awaiting the military replacement. This has the potential trickle-down 
impact of removing key knowledge from another part of the organization supplying the 
temporary replacement. A further review of the impacts of personnel shifts, both in 
military and industry environments, on organizational risk management would be very 
worthy of future research. This could include research into personnel retention methods 
as well as knowledge retention for when employees leave an organization. 
Finally, as many of the tenets of enterprise risk management assume enterprise 
leadership engagement in identifying and mitigating risks, more research into the amount 
of risk management training that executives receive would be valuable. Perhaps there 
should be a core set of training or other experience with risk management that leaders, 
especially within DOD, should take before assuming an enterprise management position. 
Research into effective enterprise risk management techniques and training associated 
with those techniques would be beneficial to have as a minimum standard. 
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APPENDIX.  ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT EVALUATION 
MATRIX 
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Risk Management Best Practices 
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